Hungarian Youth in the Third Decade

Selection from the 2021-2023 Issues of the Y.Z. Journal of Youth

Ed.: Péter Pillók – Krisztina Kolozsvári – Miklós Gyorgyovich



Ismeretlen ismerőseink: a fiatalok - 3.

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Budapest, 2024.

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Publisher: Péter Kovács, president

ISBN 978-615-6816-02-3

"Ismeretlen ismerőseink: a fiatalok" series - part 3.

First edition

Published by the National Youth Council of Hungary, Budapest, 2024.
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We are delighted that you can hold in your hands the English-language selection of our journal, the YZ! In 2021, the National Youth Council of Hungary (NYC), in cooperation with the National Association of Doctoral Students of Hungary (DOSZ), has launched a youth journal that provides an opportunity to publish a variety of studies, professional articles and publicist articles on youth, youth affairs and youth work.

The aim of the journal is, among other things, to strengthen professional and methodological dialogue, to create a platform for (young) researchers and professionals, to support the work of youth professionals, and to raise awareness among decision-makers about current issues and phenomena affecting young people and their significance. We are honoured and proud that the editorial board and the advisory board of the journal are made up of some of the most renowned researchers and thinkers in contemporary Hungarian youth sociology.

We believe the journal is a niche intellectual product. Although there are several periodic research projects in our country (the Large-Sample Youth Survey, which has been carried out every four years since 2000), it is important for us to be able to act as a kind of youth policy think tank and to provide space for the most topical issues and up-to-date research results.

The first issue of our journal was published in 2021 and since then we have published ten issues - from these ten issues we have selected the papers that appear here. Among other things, the reader will be able to learn about the differences between school bullying and cyberbullying, new trends in volunteering among generations Y and Z, the relationship between public institutions and community development, and the parenting choices of teenagers living in extreme poverty, factors determining well-being at different career periods, perceptions of the EU among young people, how Generation Y and Z Roma girls search for identity, trends in young people's political involvement, and trends in large-scale youth surveys over two decades.

We do not want to hide our aim with this volume: we would like the current state of Hungarian youth research to be interpretable and visible on an international level, and we would like to present a slice of the valuable works and studies that have been available in the unique language of our country. Our long-term vision is to build a journal of youth studies relevant at the Central European level, which, in addition to its dominant role in our country, can also gain international recognition. This volume is both a milestone and a building block in this process.

The Publishers - Presidency of the National Youth Council of Hungary

Lectori Salutem!

In the last decades, the issue of young people's social and political participation has been a major focus of sociological research. Demographic trends, such as ageing and depopulation, and global challenges, such as environmental crises and economic fluctuations, are forcing a reassessment of the role of young people in decision-making.

Involving young people in decision-making processes is not only a way to strengthen democratic participation, but also a strategic step towards social sustainability and intergenerational justice. Active young people are essential to foster social innovation and change by bringing new perspectives and solutions to current and future challenges.

The latest volume in the series „Ismeretlen ismerőseink: a fiatalok" contains English translations of studies published in the journal Y.Z., which may be of interest to youth professionals in various fields. The volume focuses on young people's perceptions of the European Union, youth policy and advocacy, volunteering, having children, well-being at work, finding identity, and security in the digital space.

Small sample studies, case studies and background analyses provide an interesting slice of the life situation of young people, especially those aged 18-24 and 25-29, while large sample studies and international data allow us to look at the situation of young people in a broader context.

As in previous publications, this volume takes a unique approach to youth issues, this time from the perspective of young doctoral students, students and researchers. The researchers behind the volume bring a wide range of professional backgrounds and fresh perspectives to their research. Their methodologies range from quantitative analyses, to complementary qualitative research, case studies and comparative studies, allowing us to gain a nuanced understanding of young people's engagement in society.

Of particular note is a study on young people's mental health, which uses a quantitative analysis of nearly 500 participants to examine the relationship between the dominant factors of well-being and individual well-being. The results of the study show that physical well-being, career prospects and good relationships are the most important dimensions for 18-24 year olds, compared to those aged 30+, where a sense of meaningfulness at work dominates.

Studies on the topic of volunteering discuss positive effects ranging from increasing social inclusion and sensitisation to genuine and close assistance, highlighting that volunteering also creates a strong emotional attachment on the part of the individual. An interesting point of these studies is that there has also been a generational shift in the volunteer population, with a ,rejuvenation of the volunteer pool' and a different attitude of volunteers themselves to the challenges of structural reorganisation.

Of particular interest is the large sample of research that shows that youth are a key group in the current crises, making their participation in decision-making processes essential. Pessimism about the European Union seems to increase with age, with younger people perceiving the EU's activities as better. Both young and older generations are critical of the EU's action on migration. In several EU countries, there is a strong feeling that young people's interests are not adequately represented in Brussels and that there is a need to identify development paths and actively involve young people.

The political interest of young people in Hungary has been declining in recent years, but a small group of young people is clearly active. Given the potential of young people to open up new perspectives, more and more governments are attaching importance to reaching out to young people and are developing various programmes to do so. From Apathy to Action explains why youth activism is useful and necessary, how political participation is evolving today, what obstacles young people face and what good practices some nations are following.

We believe that this volume will not only provide valuable insights for the scientific community, but will also encourage policy makers, educators and young people to become actively involved in promoting social change. Let us therefore allow this latest volume in the „Ismeretlen ismerőseink: a fiatalok" series to be not only an academic landmark, but also an invitation to a journey of discovery where together we can shape the future, recognising the key role of young people in decision-making processes.

The Editors







01

Anna Mária Bartal[1]

In the Revolving Door

New Trends in Volunteering by Generations Y and Z

Introduction

Generational research refers to those born between 1980 and 2000 as Generation Y. Using this analogy, the Hungarian voluntary sector is also living through its Generation Y era, as it was reborn after the regime change from a legacy of "voluntary social work", but in fact it was not until the early 2000s that its role in society and its contribution to individual well-being became recognised and accepted.

This study aims to review the main trends in volunteering of Generation Y and Z, which have been the subject of international volunteering literature for almost twenty years. These challenges are already being confronted - sometimes more directly, sometimes more indirectly - by Hungarian youth and young volunteer organisations, but they have not yet become an integral part of the professional dialogue.

The collective versus reflexive "style" of volunteering

Since the early 2000s, a new theme has emerged in international volunteering research. Namely, the study and analysis of how the postmodern risk society, which has brought about a structural change in paid work (Beck, 1986, p. 222), the information society (Castells, 2005) and technological developments, which have shaped new forms of human coexistence and communication, affect volunteers in general and volunteering of Generation Y in particular.

Until then, we have had a well-established and fixed idea that volunteering has a "collective" style, based on an ethic of service, commitment to the community and a sense of duty (Hustinx & Lammertyn, 2003, p. 168). This sense of commitment and duty was most explicitly manifested in the regularity of volunteering, in addition to organisational loyalty.

In contrast, in the 2000s, organisations employing volunteers found that their "new volunteers" had a different attitude to the classic organisational expectations and to volunteering itself. According to Hustinx (2001), "new volunteering and volunteers" are characterized by less interest in regular, structured volunteering, but rather by a desire to undertake more focused, more free-flowing tasks. This new "style" of volunteering has been termed a "reflexive form" of volunteering, reflecting the personal interests and needs of the volunteer, and is more sporadic in its regularity, temporary and not explicitly based on organisational loyalty (Hustinx & Lammertyn, 2003, p. 168).

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[1] sociologist, non-profit researcher, editor-in-chief of *Önkéntes Szemle*

Episodic volunteering

Not only has volunteering become an increasingly heterogeneous activity, but short-term, so-called episodic volunteering has become increasingly dominant alongside traditional, long-term and regular volunteering (Hustinx & Lammertyn, 2003). The remarkable changes in the frequency of volunteering are both its massification and it being strongly linked to sociodemographic characteristics (age, place of residence, education, type of work). It is important to underline that this massification did not imply that the frequency of episodic volunteering was equally distributed among all strata of volunteers, as it became a measurable phenomenon mainly among the more highly qualified Generation Y volunteers who were studying in big cities or working in atypical jobs.

According to Hunstinx et al. (2008, p. 52), the distinction between episodic and regular volunteering can be drawn based on the following criteria: regular volunteers are those who volunteer at least once a month (over a 12-month reference period). Episodic volunteering is shorter and less frequent, ranging from a few months to a one-off event. Macduff (2005, p. 51) distinguishes three forms of episodic volunteering:

- temporary volunteering (one day or a few hours);
- interim volunteering (less than six months);
- occasional volunteering (an activity undertaken intermittently and for a short period of time, but can also be linked to a specific event each year).

According to Hustinx et al. (2008, p. 64), social incentives and the pattern of the primary socialization environment are the determinants of the retention of episodic volunteers (while altruistic motives are the determinants of the retention of regular volunteers).

The revolving door of volunteers or the dilemma of organisational and individual interests

For organisations that employ volunteers, regular volunteers provide predictability, a long-term return on investment of time, training and education. And loyalty to the organisation provides a basis for cooperation.

However, new generations of volunteers have a different attitude and commitment to volunteering. Most of these volunteers want to have as positive an experience as possible, as quickly as possible. Their motivation is more strongly determined by their individualistic ideas (they prefer to receive from volunteering); they (also) want to experience their freedom and creativity in volunteering (Rochester, 2018).

They also tend to see volunteering less as a "cause" and more as a field of concrete experiences and rewards, and if their ideas are not met by the chosen organisation or volunteering, they quickly move on, looking for another organisation or another type of volunteering. This is why Evans and Saxton (2005) refer to this group of volunteers as "time-driven", while earlier Dekker and Halman (2003, p. 8) referred to them as "revolving door volunteers".

In the dilemma of organisational and individual interests, Dekker and Halman (2003) also raised the question of whether this 'revolving door' type of volunteering is really well responded to by organisations. They saw that declining organisational loyalty may not necessarily mean a decline in engagement, but rather that with greater organisational flexibility these volunteer groups could

be reached. And individualisation does not necessarily have a negative impact on volunteering but is a trend that may force organisations to adapt flexibly to it. The 'new organisations' of the 'new volunteers' should not seek to assimilate them, but to engage this 'time-driven' group through flexible management based on volunteer autonomy.

Offline and/or online volunteering

The Covid-19 pandemic was "necessary" to realise how radically the digital society can change the "classic" form of volunteering (offline volunteering), although we have been learning more and more about online volunteering in the last five years (cf. e.g. Ihm, 2017; Ackerman & Manatchal, 2018). Its emergence is explained by its advantages, such as geographical and temporal flexibility, freedom, anonymity, lower commitment levels, etc. On the other hand, online volunteering can also involve members of groups who cannot participate in the work of an organisation (offline) due to physical and other constraints. Thirdly, online volunteering is an almost self-evident and exploitable alternative to offline volunteering for the children of the digital society.

Again, it should be noted that territorial and social differences may differentiate these access opportunities. This is suggested by the findings of Ackerman and Manatchal (2018), who found that women over 35 years of age, with higher education and confidence levels, were more open to offline volunteering. Men under 35 were more likely to volunteer online. Both groups had in common that their members had a wide network of contacts.

On the organisational side, it can now be said that the use of new technologies and social platforms for volunteer recruitment has become fairly routine. This is illustrated by the fact that during the COVID-19 pandemic, informal groups of young volunteers were organised on social networking sites in „a blink of an eye", for example for online education, social assistance, and donations. Formal organisations that were able to move their volunteering programmes quickly and efficiently into the online space increased the diversity and openness of their organisation, bringing new perspectives, knowledge, skills and abilities into the life of their organisation.

What message do the research findings presented above send to youth and youth voluntary organisations?

The results of both "Önkéntesség Magyarországon 2018" (Volunteering in Hungary 2018) (Gyorgyovich et al., 2020) and the European Values Survey 2017/18 wave (Bartal, 2020) show that there has been a generational shift in formal, organisational volunteering. On the one hand, there is a ‚rejuvenation' of the volunteer pool, thanks to an increased share of 18–29-year-olds (34%). This structural shift is expected to present the same challenges to Hungarian volunteer organisations as it did to foreign ones in the mid-2000s. In other words, these volunteers will have a different attitude towards organisational expectations and the frequency of their volunteering will shift towards more episodic volunteering.

On the other hand, this ‚rejuvenation' was quite differentiated within the age group: it was mainly significant in the 18-25 age group (21%), while the proportion of organisational volunteers remained significantly lower (13%) among 26–29-year-olds (Bartal, 2021). 26–29-year-olds

require a different volunteering approach - in terms of recruitment, retention and employment - than younger people. This age group is less likely to be addressed by the slogans of ,trendy', ,cool', and ,fun' volunteering because they see the value of volunteering in what they can put back into their own resources, and how they can put their acquired skills to good use. In return, they can therefore be entrusted with more autonomous, skills-related tasks (Bartal, 2019).

Organizations should respond to these changes with much greater flexibility, on the one hand, and with a motivation-based approach to volunteer management, on the other, rather than rigid, organization-centric volunteer management methods.

Finally, taking all these problems into account, it should also be noted that most of the organisations have forgotten to be „interesting" and to change for potential volunteers. I believe that one of the most important future challenges for the vast majority of organisations employing volunteers is to find new ways and methods to break out of the current deadlock.

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

02

Barnabás Kurucz

Volunteering Today: The Role of Age

Introduction

In this study, I am looking for answers to the question of to what extent and in what form volunteering is present in the values and lifestyles of different age groups. On the basis of the types of volunteering that are more typical for older and younger age groups, I will examine to what extent the research conducted by Századvég in 2018, Önkéntesség Magyarországon 2018 (Volunteering in Hungary 2018), is in line with international theory, and if there are differences, how the domestic pattern differs. After the introductory chapter, I present the literature framework, followed by the basic methodological information. I then proceed to an analysis of the empirical data.

Theoretical foundations

There is still no uniformly accepted definition of volunteering in the literature (Gyorgyovich et al., 2018, p. 13), and therefore I define volunteering by summarising the recent attempts to define it and by asking a question in the database available to me. In their study, Anna Mária Bartal and Zoltán Kmetty (2011) defined volunteering as an activity that is defined by international institutions (e.g. UN, EU) and by domestic professional academic research as something

- "which is not performed for remuneration, although reimbursement of expenses or token payment may be allowed,
- which must be voluntary, i.e. performed by the person's own free will,
- which is for the benefit of another person or society, although it is known to be beneficial to the volunteer" (Bartal & Kmetty, 2011, p. 4).

Gyorgyovich et al., based on the experience of expert interviews and the pilot surveys of the relevant research, identified almost the same dimensions, i.e. the voluntary nature of the activity, the absence of remuneration and the orientation towards a social environment beyond the circle of friends and family (Gyorgyovich et al., 2018, pp. 182-283).

It is important to note that some believe that the international trend is also changing in Hungary, i.e. the perception of volunteering is changing (cf. Bartal, 2010). As a result, two groups are increasingly emerging in relation to volunteering (Czike & Bartal, 2005). On the one hand, the so-called "revolving door" type among young people, while the "new purpose-seeking" type among retired people (Hustinx, 2001). According to Hustinx, classic volunteering in the elderly is characterised by identification with traditional cultural norms, adherence to a solid organisational framework, idealism in the selection of the group to be helped, and organisational opportunities, long-term helping, and altruism. In contrast, for younger people, the new volunteering is more individualised, less attached to an organisation, more actualised in terms of problem-solving and

the group to be helped, less traditional, more 'do-it-yourself' and shorter in time (Hustinx, 2001, pp. 62-65). Behind the latter pattern is what Inglehart calls the postmodernisation of the post-World War II processes. Its central theses are self-expression, freedom of choice, increasing individual needs and the rise of the need for autonomy (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). As Kollár et al. put it: 'In developed countries, membership of public welfare and women's movements is typically older. In contrast, membership in sport and recreation and youth work organisations tends to be more youth-oriented. Looking at the different types of volunteer activities, it can be observed that the share of older people is significantly higher in the fields of public welfare and church activities, while in the fields of sports and recreation and youth work, younger people are over-represented" (Kollár, Gyorgyovich & Szodorai, 2018, p. 3).

Based on literature descriptions, the difference between age groups has a significant impact on volunteering activity (KSH, 2011; Bartal, 2010), so I am interested in finding out whether similar breaks can be registered in Hungary or whether the life of Hungarian society is more homogeneous. The question is relevant only because, more generally, no radical break in value continuity can be observed in Hungarian society (Simon & Kurucz, 2021). This is confirmed by Kollár et al. who also found a different pattern than in the West in relation to volunteering (Kollár, Gyorgyovich & Szodorai, 2018, p. 3).

Database

In the framework of the Önkéntesség Magyarországon 2018 (Volunteering in Hungary 2018) research, Századvég conducted a nationwide, representative questionnaire survey of 2,000 people covering the entire adult population in the autumn of the relevant year, the primary aim of which was to determine the number and composition of the Hungarian volunteer population according to various demographic variables. This database forms the basis of my empirical sources.

Analysis

I will start the analysis by presenting some general information. Regarding volunteering, it can be seen that there is no significant difference between age groups, with the proportion of people in most age groups who do not volunteer/ have not volunteered being around 60%. The only exception to this is the 50-59 age group, where 51% have not volunteered, while 27.8% have volunteered in the last year and 21.2% have volunteered for more than a year – making this age group the most active in volunteering. The proportion of those who have volunteered in the last year was around 26% across age groups, except for the over 60s, where only 18.7% did so. The proportion of those who have volunteered for more than one year varies widely by age group, with the lowest proportion among 18-29 year olds (12.5%) and the highest among 50-59 year olds (21.2%). Thus, the data do not show that volunteering is disappearing from the daily lives of newer generations, but rather that a certain continuity can be observed.

Figure 1: Voluntary activity is something done voluntarily, free of charge, without remuneration, for the benefit of another person or persons or community, outside one's FAMILY, RELIGION, CLOSE FRIENDS. Have you ever done such an activity?



If we look at the frequency of voluntary activity, we can see that daily activity is rare, with a slightly higher proportion occurring on a weekly basis, while the two main peaks are in the monthly and once or twice a year categories. Only a relatively small percentage of respondents volunteer at most once a year. The internal distribution of frequencies suggests that there are no radical differences between age groups, but some more specific patterns emerge. For example, the 50-59 age group is the most active in terms of monthly frequency or less (57.1%), while the 18-29 age group is only 45.4%.

Figure 2: How often have you volunteered in the last year? (N=294)



In addition to frequency, I also included the number of days spent volunteering in a year in the focus of my analysis. The resulting response pattern is an interesting addition to the previous data set, which showed that there is no significant difference between the frequency of volunteering. However, it is not clear from the data in the current graph (and the survey) how many days volunteering was carried out in a single period, only the total number of days is shown. However, I believe that cautious conclusions can be drawn. There is a significant difference by age, with the oldest age group being much more dominated by volunteering for 10 days or less (62.1%) than, say, the youngest (47.7%). Volunteering for between 11 and 20 days is an even more significant category, especially for the 40-49 age group (34%). As young people volunteer slightly more but, as the previous graph shows, slightly less frequently than older people, if there is a significant difference, it tends to be more towards young people volunteering in a more “clustered” way. While this claim can only be tentatively supported by the current data, it seems to nuance the starting point of the literature chapter that young people only volunteer in shorter phases.

Figure 3: How many days have you volunteered in the last year?



If we look at motivational factors by age group, we find that there are more significant differences. The categories are taken from Gyorgyovich et al. (2018, p. 57). The traditional categories included: religious reasons, personal involvement, compassion, conviction, public concern, tradition, and environment. The modern category included inner motivation, the desire to become a better person, self-improvement, meeting new people, personal challenge, and a useful use of leisure time. The two pure categories (purely modern and purely traditional) had the lowest representation, while the mixed category had the highest proportion of respondents. By age group, the relative majority of young people (18-29) (34%) fell into the mixed category, while those in the more modern group (28.3%) made up the majority.

Those in the more traditional (18.9%) and purely traditional (15.1%) categories make up the minority. The traditional category was highest among 30-39 year olds (40%), while 32% had modern motivations. Those with mixed motivations accounted for 28%. The modern category was highest in the 50-59 age group, with 44.9% having more or purely modern motivations. Although in general the older age groups tend to be more inclined towards traditional motivations, the mixed category is still relatively high. It is interesting to note that in the youngest age group, 34% were more or purely traditionally motivated, while in the oldest age category the same proportion was 38.2%, so that, as with most age groups (except 50-59), we can speak of a subtle shift rather than a radical break between generations. To this extent, this data series somewhat nuances the literature hypothesis.

Figure 4: Motivation (N=294)



When looking at future volunteering plans, the older the age group, the higher the proportion of people who do not plan to volunteer in the future. Behind this pattern, of course, are the physical limitations of old age and the increasing commitment to family. Even so, proportionally, fewer people are planning to volunteer, although the largest proportion (48.7%) of those aged 40-49 indicated this. Understandably, those aged 60 and over have the lowest proportion (23.8%) of those who plan to volunteer in the future. So, except for the oldest age group, similar patterns can be observed, and it is expected that this form of social action will continue to exist in the future, from the point of view of the elderly.

Figure 5: Do you plan to volunteer in the future?



In terms of future-oriented volunteering, it can be seen that the largest proportion of people aged over 60 years is involved in helping the poor and homeless, while the largest relative proportion (30.5%) of this age group is made up of older people. Animals were most prominent among those in the 18-29 age group (23.2%), while the proportion of elderly people was lowest (13.7%). Newborn babies were the most popular choice (25.7%) for people in the 40-49 age group, while the same age group had the lowest proportion of people who helped animals. Environmental protection was not highlighted by a higher proportion in any age group. All the other response options were grouped together in the "other" category, as they were all very low scores. At this point, a more significant differentiation emerges, with more specificities of life situations becoming apparent. An example of this is volunteering with animals, as while older people tend to be less emotionally attached to their animals, young people tend to be much more emotionally involved. The situation is similar for the poor and the homeless, but in reverse, as this group is clearly on the horizon of action for older people, but less so for young people. The difference described in the literature review is clearly visible here, with older people tending to be more in the 'classic' groups, as opposed to younger people.

Figure 6: Which of the following would you help the most?

	The poor and homeless	Animals	Environment	Newborns, children, young people	The elderly	Other
60+	20,0%	7,4%	3,2%	14,7%	30,5%	24,2%
50-59	15,8%	11,8%	5,3%	11,8%	23,7%	31,6%
40-49	18,1%	3,8%	7,6%	25,7%	22,9%	21,9%
30-39	14,4%	13,4%	4,1%	14,4%	26,8%	26,9%
18-29	16,8%	23,2%	5,3%	16,8%	13,7%	24,2%

Finally, I will show what the respondents think about the attitude of Hungarian society towards volunteering. Overall, it can be seen that the majority of the respondents in the survey are positive towards volunteering, while about a third of them are neutral. Only a minority felt that Hungarian society would be negative towards volunteering. The response structure of the different age groups does not show a significant difference, so the generational difference does not significantly differentiate this dimension.

Figure 7: What do you think is the attitude of Hungarian society towards volunteering?



The reasons for volunteering

So far, I have only tried to draw the contours of the attitudes of age groups towards volunteering by means of distributions. In what follows, I will explore the dimensions of individualism[1], communality[2] and attitudes towards institutional commitment[3] in search of possible differences between old and new types of volunteering. In practice, this means that I use linear regressions to investigate the factors that influence the actual performance of volunteering.

First, I analyse the agreement with the following statement: „Voluntary activity is a matter of individual choice". Through this statement, I want to capture the possible affinity or aversion to the modern form of voluntary motivation. Among the age groups, the only significant association was among those aged over sixty, for whom the R^2 was particularly low (4%) but the beta was -0.21[4], so the less the elderly agreed with the statement, the more likely they were to volunteer. This points to an important point in their perception of life, which can be related to their agreement with the classic type of volunteering or rather their rejection of the new type (individualised activity).

I will then present the impact of association membership. The relationship is significant for all age groups and the R^2 values are slightly higher than for the previous variables: 18-29: 6.7%; 30-39: 5%; 40-49: 12.2%; 50-59: 9.5%; 60+: 10%. The beta values show that for all age groups, membership in an organisation increased the likelihood of volunteering. It can be clearly seen that institutional affiliation continues to promote volunteering, to the extent that individualisation has not displaced the institutional form.

Finally, I looked at perceptions of community service in schools. It can be said that there is a significant relationship everywhere except for the 30-39 age group. The R^2 value is higher for young people (18-29: 11%), while for the other age groups it ranges between 3 and 5%. The beta values clearly show, especially for young people, that the more someone agrees with compulsory community service in schools, the more likely they are to volunteer themselves.

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[1] „Volunteering is an individual choice"

[2] Are you a member of an association, circle, club or foundation?

[3] How much do you agree with the introduction of community service in schools?

[4] The R2 value indicates the predictive power of the model, which in this case is very low. The beta here shows that the probability of agreeing with the sentence decreases among people in the older age group (60+) (the beta value gives the direction of the correlation).

Figure 8: Beta of significant regressions

Variable	18–29	30–39	40–49	50–59	60+
"Volunteering is an individual choice"	-	-	-	-	-0.213
Are you a member of an association, circle, club or foundation?	0.269	0.236	0.356	0.317	0.328
How much do you agree with the introduction of community service in schools?	0.345	-	0.193	0.249	0.236

Summary

The new and old types of volunteering outlined in the literature imply a kind of rupture or more radical differentiation between the values of older and younger age groups (Hustinx, 2001), which can be captured by the concept of postmodernisation (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). From a distance, it can be seen that volunteering itself does not seem to disappear from the world of the newer generations, according to the present data, but continuity can be detected. This is confirmed by the pattern of responses to the question on the frequency of activity (daily, weekly, monthly, etc.), as the distribution of frequencies suggests that there are no radical differences between age groups, but some more specific patterns emerge. The dimension of the number of days spent volunteering in the past year by different age groups may be somewhat surprising, as young people spend slightly more days volunteering but, based on the time-lapse, do so slightly less frequently than older people, so if there is a significant difference, it tends to be that young people are more ‚clustered' in their involvement. While this claim can only be tentatively supported by the current data, it seems to nuance the starting point of the literature chapter, which suggests that young people volunteer for shorter periods of time while older people volunteer for longer. I have tried to capture the motivations behind volunteering along the lines of modern and traditional categories to capture possible generational differences. It is interesting to note that in the youngest age group, 34% were more or purely traditionally motivated, while in the oldest age category, the same proportion was 38.2%, with a higher proportion of people with a modern motivational background in the young age group than in the older age group. So we can speak of a subtle shift, but not a radical break between generations, more akin to a slow reform than a revolution. To this extent, this data series, somewhat nuanced, confirms the hypothesis of the literature. There is also a shift in the

choice of the target group to be helped, with animals playing a greater role among young people than among older generations. For the latter, the poor and the elderly were given priority. The differentiation described in the literature review is clearly visible here, as the classic target groups have been somewhat devalued and new categories have emerged that were not previously relevant. In the linear regressions, it became apparent that the generation over 60 showed a slight aversion to the new motivation to volunteer, but no aversion or affinity[5] could be detected in the other age groups. However, membership in an organisation increased the likelihood of volunteering in all age groups, as did a positive perception of community service in schools, except the 30-39 age group, to the extent that this element of the traditional category (institutional attachment) is still present in the life of the generations.

Overall, the approach to shaping the values of age groups cannot be called revolutionary, but there is an unmistakable transformation of volunteering in Hungary, which is taking the form of a new type of volunteering.

[5] For a detailed discussion of the concept, see: Dávid Kollár (2020). A környezetvédelem és a posztmaterializmus szelleme, Replika, 114, 133–155.

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

03

Éva Vas

From Apathy to Action: Approaches to Involving Young People in Politics

Introduction

The more active involvement of young people in politics has gradually gained ground over the past decade, as the political interest of young people has been declining for some time. According to Wray-Lake (2019), young people are often later or less involved in political participation and less informed about decision-making issues. As their voices could add new perspectives to the policy dialogue, more and more governments are attaching importance to reaching out to young people and efforts are being made to develop programmes to educate them to become active citizens. These measures, in addition to contributing to the earlier political engagement of young people, can also help to address today's global challenges by channelling the unique perspectives of youth, which can act as a catalyst to stimulate young people's interest in political issues.

Today, it is often argued that young people are alienated from politics or are becoming more apathetic about politics. One of the reasons for this, Wallace (2003) suggests, is that young people are becoming increasingly individualised and are concerned with new values and issues rather than traditional politics. Wallace (2003) reports, based on research in several countries, that young people are not, on the whole, strongly represented in traditional political parties or political debates. Hammer and Charle (2002) argue that this is because traditional politics rarely addresses the interests of young people, who are reluctant to join the dialogue because they do not feel involved and therefore tend to stay away from policy-related forums. One reason for this phenomenon may be that in most Western countries, due to general demographic changes, the proportion of young people is lower than in other age groups, so politicians do not make much effort to win their votes, as the support of other age groups is sufficient to get them elected. Another explanation could be the decline in youth employment – with higher unemployment rates and longer periods of time spent in education – which is associated with a delay in joining politics.

Kovacheva (1995) points to differences within Europe, for example, in Eastern Europe there is a clear decline in political participation, while in Western Europe there is a growing emphasis on involving young people and encouraging them to participate in politics, with the result that the downward trend has been halted or even reversed. In Eastern European countries, youth participation in traditional political arenas is low, but they are still able to mobilise on important issues, which means that they are not completely excluded from political issues. Bynner and colleagues (cited by Wallace, 2003) have shown that young people are more active in certain political dimensions, such as moral conservatism (including sexual ethics and work ethics) and environmental issues.

Clarification of the definition

According to Kaase (cited in Gaiser et al., 2010), political participation is generally understood as "activities that citizens, alone or in association with others, undertake voluntarily to influence political decisions". Gaiser et al. (2010) traced the history of the concept: until the early 1960s, political participation was still primarily understood as participation in political decision-making processes and included participation in elections and joining political parties, while later on a distinction was made between traditional and non-traditional forms of political participation. The latter include protest campaigns, demonstrations, strikes and the launching and signing of petitions. However, voting in elections remains the most common form of political participation among young people. The majority of them consider voting to be the most important arena for democratic participation and political influence, followed by joining petitions and then participating in authorised demonstrations (Gaiser et al., 2010).

Increasing youth political participation

The presence of young people in politics

The United Nations Development Programme's paper on youth political participation (UNDP, 2013) points out that the focus on youth political empowerment is a relatively recent phenomenon, but certainly timely, especially as many countries have undergone democratic transitions in recent decades. The World Programme of Action for Youth to the Year 2000 and Beyond[1] (UNDP, 2013) highlights the importance of youth participation in decision-making but does not provide specific guidelines for how to achieve this.

In most countries, you can enter parliament at the age of 25 or over, and in general, politicians also refer to those aged 35–40 as "young people". If we look at the MEPs for the 2019–2024 term of the European Parliament,[2] we see that the average age ranges from 45–50 years old. However, we also find examples of politicians who are actually in the youth age bracket, for example, the youngest MEP from Denmark was 21, from France 23 and from Spain 25. According to the UNDP's paper on youth political participation (UNDP, 2013), more and more countries are recognising the role of young people in generating new ideas or even in effectively resolving conflicts and are therefore developing youth plans and sometimes creating new innovative programmes and events to inform young people.

Benefits of involving young people

According to Gaiser et al. (2010), membership and active participation in organisations, clubs and associations provide young people with opportunities to live out their interests, communicate

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1 At its 1995 General Assembly, the United Nations adopted the World Programme of Action for Youth to the Year 2000 and Beyond (WPAY) policy framework, which provides practical guidelines for national action and international support to improve the situation of young people in member countries.

2 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2019/637976/EPRS_ATA(2019)637976_EN.pdf (Accessed: 12/4/2022)

with each other, develop their identity and build social relationships. Participation in civic activities is important not only at an individual level but also at a societal level; it can be a prerequisite for the functioning of modern societies.

According to speakers at the International IDEA (2022) online event in November 2022, young people's participation in politics is beneficial as their enthusiasm and innovation can be an important driver for change, especially in participatory methods that combine the passion of young people with the experience of older policy actors and decision-makers. The discussion highlighted that in many countries the number of people participating in elections is declining, which weakens the participatory aspect of democracy. One way to increase the rate could be for countries to pay attention to building meaningful and active youth participation, which includes ensuring that young people's voices are truly heard and that they are involved in the decision-making process, perhaps by making their views known through debates.

Possible forms of political participation

According to Gaiser et al. (2010), there are three types of social and political participation, based on organisational form, which can help to engage young people through different programmes or platforms. On the one hand, there are the traditional clubs, associations and organisations in which interests are clearly defined, structured according to functions and which see themselves as membership organisations. In this form, membership of individuals is long-term, often involving commitment, and instrumental relationships are relatively strong. Traditional organisational forms may have a political dimension (e.g. political parties) or be organised around interests and objectives (e.g. trade unions or professional associations), or be non-political, i.e. private in nature, e.g. sports clubs and social/civil society organisations. The second type of organisation is defined by informal groups, which are non-governmental organisations and are usually referred to as 'new social movements'. This category includes environmental groups, citizens' initiatives and self-help groups. These groups are organised outside mainstream politics, but in most cases, they are linked to political or public policy issues. This type is not strictly organised, like traditional forms of organisation, and generally does not have as long a history as the first group. The third is the situation-specific form, which involves participatory activities. This form of participation focuses on political activities that serve temporary or situation-specific political goals, such as petitions or demonstrations.

Obradovic and Masten (2007) found that from adolescence to young adulthood, the way in which youth engage in politics is constantly changing as they acquire more skills, knowledge of systems and other competencies. Community ties such as schools or community organisations (religious or cultural institutions) offer young people the opportunity to belong to a community and to develop a sense of belonging within a group, an experience that can help them to engage more effectively in the political processes that will emerge later in life. These communities facilitate entry into politics by providing young people with social capital, which will help them to become more involved in political organisations, as they will have the knowledge and membership experience that will effectively facilitate their political involvement. In adolescence, such community

ties among peers are often also present in the context of extra-curricular activities. Longitudinal studies have shown that young people's participation in arts activities or clubs is associated with more optimal peer relationships, which predicts more active political engagement in the future.

In contrast, Wray-Lake (2019) argues that the forms of social capital that support political engagement can be culture-specific so we cannot speak of general factors. The development of exclusionary and inclusive attitudes that have emerged or are emerging in the history of each country determines the civic culture of a group. For example, interpersonal and institutional discrimination or experiences of marginalisation can demotivate electoral engagement and reduce young people's faith in the fairness of society and government (Wray-Lake, 2019). Therefore, it is important to consider the political history of each country when examining youth political activism and, depending on this, formulate future guidelines for more effective youth engagement.

According to Wray-Lake (2019), conversations in the classroom, with peers and family members are also significant influences, even independently of each other, on political engagement, showing that such conversations have cross-contextual relevance in young people's lives. There is a consensus that political debates foster political engagement among adolescents, yet in many countries today there are still no platforms for such programmes, either in schools or in other community settings. This is due to the reluctance of teachers, especially in Eastern European societies, to discuss political issues in the classroom, and to the taboo in many families about educating young people politically.

Factors that make political involvement difficult

An important element of representativeness in political systems is that all parts of society are involved in the political process, so if a significant proportion of young people have no influence or say in issues that affect the life of the group, this representativeness is compromised. For this reason, it is important in the long term that young people are involved and have a say in shaping current and future policy. Active political participation is a fundamental political and democratic right, essential for building a stable and peaceful society. In order to ensure that young people are properly represented in the political arena, they need to know their rights, and for this, it is essential that they are widely informed by the leading decision-makers in their countries. It is only by knowing these rights and obligations that young people will be able to participate meaningfully in decision-making, and it is therefore necessary to start early with an introduction to political life, either through the education system or by increasing participation in voluntary programmes (The Electoral Knowledge Network, 2023).

According to the Electoral Knowledge Network (2023), youth engagement is hampered by the fact that young people can quickly lose interest in getting involved in the political process if there are barriers to institutionalised participation. This phenomenon can be exacerbated if young people feel that their views are not taken seriously by policymakers or are not listened to at all. On the other hand, this can also lead to a response where politicians lose interest in taking young people's views into account, as they perceive that they cannot win their votes and, as a consequence, they are no longer the primary target group when designing political programmes.

This process, experienced by both young people and policy-makers, is leading to young people being increasingly excluded from decision-making and from debates on socio-economic and political issues that are key to them (The Electoral Knowledge Network, 2023).

Wray-Lake (2019) has pointed out that in democratic countries, young people are alienated from political participation because of a hostile political climate towards immigrants, ethnic groups or sexual minorities, with which they are no longer comfortable. At the same time, young people are a support base for political and social change efforts; they not only 'make their voices heard' at the polls, but also interact with candidates, follow political news and take positions on political and environmental issues. Political engagement also includes manifestations such as political beliefs, attitudes, interest, efficacy and knowledge.

Schlozman (2012) argues that the distribution of opportunities for political participation is far from equal, with socio-economically advantaged individuals more likely to vote or interact with representatives, or to show political interest and knowledge, than their less affluent counterparts. Kahne and Middaugh (2008) studied political inequalities among young people in the US, which they found to be present from an early age and to be fundamentally the result of differences in opportunity: that is, young people with more educated parents, who are white and have higher levels of education have more opportunities for civic learning than their peers. Wray-Lake (2019) adds to this finding by arguing that although there are many opportunities for political engagement, many young people start their political participation from disadvantaged backgrounds.

Weiss (2020) pointed out that political participation is not a priority when there are more pressing, personal concerns in an individual's life, which is particularly true for young people. Because people have a finite amount of time, engaging in politics is more costly for those who have not yet settled into their lives, which is especially true for adolescents and young adults. Weiss also cites research showing that as young people get older and more experienced with the electoral and political process, they may become more active in politics. Such predisposing factors include settling down, getting married, getting an education or getting a job.

For the reasons outlined above, Weiss (2020) predicts a negative future according to the theory of generational effects, which is based on the assumption that adolescent socialisation has a significant impact on political socialisation. In other words, it implies that today's young people are less active and therefore their level of political participation in the future will not reach the level of political participation of the current older age groups. This theory is also attributed to the fact that today's young people have a harder time reaching the milestones of adulthood and, at the same time, their political participation will be delayed, which may reduce their chances of being active in political dialogue. Overall, generational effects theory predicts a more passive political participation of future adults.

Opportunities to involve young people

In view of the difficulties encountered and the low political participation of young people, an online conference was held on 15 November 2022 in the framework of the partnership between International IDEA and the European Commission on Promoting the role of youth in political and

democratic spaces. The meeting explored the youth-related commitments made by participating governments at S4D[3]. The organisers offered the opportunity for EU and non-EU governments, civil society organisations and other stakeholders to participate, discussing youth political engagement and future solutions.

The conference stressed the importance of reinforcing both old and new ways of engaging young people in democracy. Old methods included encouraging young people to participate in elections, for example by lowering the voting age to 16 in Brazil to give young people a voice earlier. Another such solution was to open political parties in Ghana to young people, which means that they can join and learn about the political process before they reach the voting age, which in the longer term could lead to active involvement. And new methods include in particular the use of online tools to help young people have a greater say in politics. In this way, social media can increase young people's awareness of political communication, as they are more likely to encounter information here than through traditional means of communication. To engage young people in politics, existing actors are also needed to open the doors to young people and actively help them. This includes political party leaders and parents who are able to provide young people with guidance on politics. The combination of these factors plays a role in young people's decision to eventually become active political actors, so it is important to consider using a combination of these methods for government leaders (International IDEA, 2022).

The use of social media and online platforms is an important way of engaging young people, but it also carries risks such as misinformation resulting from inaccurate information, which can create uncertainty among young people who want to be informed, so it is important to ensure transparency of communication platforms and to put in place measures to counter misinformation (International IDEA, 2022).

Xenos et al. (2014) add that today social media sites provide a platform for discussing political issues, consuming and exchanging political information, and supporting candidates and causes. Offline political presence can be effectively increased by participating in online political debates, which is why social media are increasingly used for political dialogue in a growing number of countries.

As mentioned earlier, we can find different approaches to the practice of politics from culture to culture. Given the strong tradition of civics education in the United States, it is worth mentioning as a possible way to engage young people. Wray-Lake (2019) examined civics education in a US sample and found a mixed picture.

Since in most cases, the lessons were not accompanied by extra-curricular activities, their effectiveness was not clearly reflected in young people's political participation. Action civics is a non-traditional form of youth engagement education, whereby young people learn and practice civic engagement through direct participation in the political process, i.e. it focuses explicitly on

[3] S4D (Summit for Democracy) is a virtual democracy summit, first held in December 2021. The aim of the summit is to „fight foreign autocracies" and renew democracies.

engaging young people in political life. These processes typically take place in a school setting, and young people are usually engaged in identifying and researching an issue of interest to them, so that they not only understand political practice but also become participants in the process.

One policy tool to engage young people is the introduction of early voter registration, which is already in place in the United States, where several states allow young people to register at 16.[4] In addition, some countries, including Austria, Brazil and Norway, have allowed young people to participate in some or all elections from the age of 16. The greatest impact is likely to be seen when a combination of lowering the voting age and civic education to prepare young people to vote is used (Wray-Lake, 2019).

Involving the youth in politics – an example of international good practice

The United Nations Development Programme's paper on youth political participation (UNDP, 2013) builds on the UNDP's 2011 call for proposals to support innovative ideas for youth as an international best practice for youth engagement. As part of this, UNDP has launched a call for proposals for youth policy dialogue called Youth in Action. The aim was to train young people to be effective leaders, to ensure greater access to justice and democratic governance, and to make useful information on political empowerment available. Thirty-seven applications were finally accepted under the programme, nine in Africa, eight in the Arab States, five in Asia and the Pacific, eight in Central and Eastern Europe and seven in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The UNDP's paper on youth political participation (UNDP, 2013) points out that the countries that won the competition were characterised by a tendency for young people to stay away from politics, which is why many countries have introduced programmes to promote young people's political participation or information. In Bangladesh, for example, a National Youth Parliament was established, giving young people the opportunity to contribute to national policy-making and to engage in direct dialogue with parliamentarians. Moldova directly targeted more vulnerable groups of young people who are inherently less involved in public life. The programme will provide disadvantaged young people with strategic advocacy skills that they can apply to key political presence issues.

There was also an initiative to reach young people through multimedia tools. In Cambodia, a series of television and radio programmes were produced for educational purposes, presenting content on young people's rights and responsibilities as citizens in an entertaining way, in an attempt to break down stereotypes that young people should stay away from politics. These examples also show the many ways in which young people can be encouraged to become more active in politics or to take an interest in political issues and debates.

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[4] Preregistration is a procedure that allows people under the age of 18 to register to vote, so that they are eligible to vote when they reach the age of 18. In some states, young people can register to vote as early as 17 if they turn 18 before the general election. https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/preregistration-for-young-voters (Accessed: 29/03/2023)

The European Parliament report[5] shows different good practices in European countries. In Italy, for example, the local government has entrusted youth policy-making to young people by setting up a Youth Advisory Board (Consulta Giovanile), which allows young people to make their voices heard by decision-makers and thus influence policy decisions. In Sweden, The Blue Hill Youth Center has been set up to bring together over 250 young people from different backgrounds to learn about community membership and to broaden their interest in policy issues through a peer learning programme. The centre does not do this in a formal political setting, but instead organises music, dance and sporting events for young people, helping them to experience a sense of belonging to the community. These initiatives are particularly good for young people to feel that their voice and role in political dialogues is important, to be able to express their ideas and to get involved in active political participation.

The European Parliament's 2012 EU Youth Report[6] provides further good practices. In Bulgaria, a national youth meeting was held in October 2010 under the Youth in Action Programme, where young people presented their experiences at a local level and made suggestions for increasing their peers' participation in public life. They also discussed with policy-makers issues affecting young people, such as career development and difficulties in finding a job and brought them to the attention of policy-makers. The success of the programme was demonstrated by the effective dialogue that was able to develop between young people and policymakers.

Summary

Today, efforts to educate young people about early political participation can be seen in many countries, and a growing number of organisations are working to inform secondary school students about their rights and responsibilities as citizens (Wray-Lake, 2019). One such website is the European Youth Forum[7]. The organisation behind it was set up in 1996 by international youth councils and youth NGOs, with the main aim of empowering young people to shape policy to the same extent as their elders. The European Youth Forum's day-to-day activities include representing the views and opinions of young people in the policy field and promoting the wider use of youth policy to various institutional actors. It also provides an opportunity for policy dialogue, so that young people can discuss the most pressing global issues and even develop proposals for solutions to them. More and more countries are recognising that young people are formulating innovative options on current policy issues, and it is timely to encourage their political involvement.

Although many European countries have programmes and strategies to involve young people in public life, Hungary does not have any specific projects or events organised in this field. As far as the literature in this field is concerned, studies on the political participation of young people in Hungary are scarce, but the growing importance of this topic makes it desirable to conduct more research in Hungary.

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[5] https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/youth/policy/youth_strategy/documents/youth-participation-brochure_en.pdf (Accessed: 31/03/2023)

[6] https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/youth/library/reports/eu-youth-report-2012_en.pdf (Accessed: 31/03/2023)

[7] https://www.youthforum.org/ (Accessed: 23/03/2023)

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04

Dávid Dudok[1]

The Relationship Between Community Cultural Institutions and Community Development[2]

Introduction

My doctoral research is concerned with the historical background of the institutional system of community education and the place and role of community development in the institutional system. The topicality of the research topic is given by the European Union programmes which aimed at the initiation of community development processes based on local identity and which promoted the community-based functioning of community cultural institutions in Hungary in the past years. Theories that provide the framework for (cultural) community development programmes in community education institutions are analysed with the help of literature, and practical experiences and attitudes are explored through empirical research. In my research, I also seek to answer the question of how it is possible to achieve the socially embedded functioning of community cultural institutions.

In the theoretical chapter of my dissertation, I will present and analyse in detail the domestic and international literature on community development, the possibilities and institutions of social participation and participatory democracy, as well as the theories of social capital that fit into my topic. In my research, I also review the characteristics of the Hungarian community cultural institutional system.

An important part of my thesis is the empirical, qualitative research in which I explore, with the help of experts, the relationship between community cultural institutions and community development. My interviewees were experts with a good knowledge of the institutional system and its development and functioning and with extensive experience in this field. In their view, the use of community development methodology can be a tool for achieving real change and meaningful dialogue between community members and institutions. The interviewees' opinions differed only in how this was done: some professionals see community development as an interdisciplinary activity in its own right, while others define it as a method to be applied within the institutional system of community education.

The partial results of my ongoing research so far suggest that, although the institutional system of community education was endangered after the political changes in 1989, it has now been reinvigorated.

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[2] This paper is an abridged, revised version of my presentation at the XXV. Tavaszi Szél Conference, 7 May 2022.

Community cultural houses is not just a public space, but a set of attitudes and skills that the people who use it possess. Experts see room for improvement in terms of participation, community support and socialisation of institutions.

In this paper, I briefly summarise the most important concepts of the theoretical framework of the research and the relevant part of the methodology used. Finally, through the analysis of the expert interviews, I will highlight the differences of opinion on the relationship between community cultural institutions and community development.

The theoretical framework of the research

To put the results of the empirical study so far into a theoretical context, it is essential to understand some key concepts. In this paper I summarise, without claiming to be exhaustive, the most important elements and ideas of the theoretical background of the research. In the following, I will briefly introduce the concepts of social capital, social intervention and community development, cultural community development and community responsive functioning.

Social capital

The theories of (social) capital relevant to sociology include theories that seek to explain the formation and reproduction of social structure, including the system of relations between groups and individuals. One of the most cited theories of capital is that of Pierre Bourdieu (1986). The Forms of Capital contains the basic principles that define the general concept of capital and its three types. Each capital can be grouped according to its field of use so that the author distinguishes between (1) economic, (2) cultural and (3) social capital. The main characteristic of economic capital is that it is directly convertible into money, based on property rights; cultural capital comprises social titles derived from schooling; while social capital comprises interpersonal and intergroup relations, obligations and hereditary titles.

For the purpose of this study, the most important issue is to clarify the concept of social capital, since development work with communities is mostly concerned with the resources that are perceived within and between groups. The amount of social capital depends on the extent of the social network, i.e. the amount of relational capital that a given person has that can be mobilised in a given context. Social capital is not permanent, but the product of a continuous process of institutionalisation, with symbolic profit generating durable relationships over time. The reproduction of a system of reciprocal obligations (i.e. social capital) is the result of the continuous maintenance of relationships, which costs the use of considerable economic capital (Bourdieu, 1986).

Another – essentially functionalist – approach to defining social capital is noted by James S. Coleman, who refers to it as a source of social action. According to Coleman (1988) what distinguishes social capital from other types of capital (physical and human capital) is that its essence lies in the structure of relationships between actors.

"Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors – whether persons or corporate actors– within the structure." (Coleman, 1988, p.98.). From this definition, it can be seen that social capital (or its subtypes) derives from the particularities of the social structure and facilitates social action, whether by individuals or by social groups acting together. Coleman distinguishes three types of social capital based on their function: (1) obligations and expectations, (2) information-flow (3) social norms (Coleman, 1988).

If we accept that social capital is the basis for collective action, we can move on to movements and relationships in civil society and social participation. The American sociologist Robert D. Putnam has written extensively on social capital, its nature and its continuing change and disappearance in US society. As Putnam (1995) puts it, social capital is the set of features of social life – networks, norms and trust – that underlie the collective action of participants. He identifies some social capital that is unrelated to political activity, which he calls civic engagement. This type of social capital may be closest to the collective actions that drive civil society.

As we have seen from the theories listed so far, social capital is primarily based on interpersonal relationships, i.e. the interactions that take place between individuals or groups in a social context. It is useful to examine these relationships more closely. According to Mark Granovetter (1982), there are basically two types of ties between people and groups of people, which he calls strong and weak ties. According to this theory, social ties between acquaintances are less likely to be formed, and strong ties are more likely to result in friendships and closer, long-term cooperation. However, the role of weak ties is at least as important: they can bridge the gaps between tight groups, reducing the distances between different social formations. A network that lacks many weak ties will become highly polarised, fragmented and isolating in the long term. As a result of the scarce and difficult-to-access social capital (here: ties), members of these groups are far from everything and have difficulty in accessing certain services, and this leads to a fragmented and incoherent society in which the distance between social groups is too great (Granovetter, 1982).

Social intervention, social participation and community development

Following Jack Rothman (2002), community intervention is defined as targeted work with communities to generate change in local society. According to the author's theoretical approach, community intervention can be divided into three broad categories: (1) locality development, (2) social planning/policy and (3) social action. Locality development type of community intervention can be equated with community development, which is also commonly used in Hungary, and aims to involve as many stakeholders as possible in the development process and to empower them through incentives for collective action and social participation. By using the tools of democracy and by establishing a constructive

dialogue between different social groups and institutions, community-based interventions in the field of local development aim at finding compromise solutions among the stakeholders (Rothman, 2002).

In English-language literature, the term citizen participation is often used to define participation in society, which suggests the ideal of a conscious and active citizen who is able and willing to do something for himself. In Hungarian literature on community development participation has two meanings: (1) participation at the level of the individual, (2) participation at the level of the community. In the first case, it is about the individual taking responsibility for managing his or her own life, taking responsibility for him or herself and his or her actions, and undertaking self-management. In the case of participation at the community level, the individual is aware of the knowledge and relationships of his/her community, and turns to his/her environment with trust – this is a sphere of mutual support and solidarity (Vercseg, 2005). One of the best known theories of social participation is Sherry Arnstein's (1969) ladder of participation, which is divided into three main categories (from bottom to top: nonparticipation, degrees of tokenism, degrees of citizen power) and eight subcategories of participation types, depending on the real say citizens have in decisions that affect them (Csanád, Csizmady & Kőszeghy, 2010).

Community development – development by the community – is work at the local level that promotes higher levels of social participation in cooperation with community members through methods of cooperation and joint action (Vercseg & Varga, 1998). The primary purpose of community development is to help meet the social needs of individuals, to provide opportunities for belonging to local groups, and to contribute to strengthening the bonds of individuals and communities through participation, involvement, and empowerment. To improve quality of life, community development helps people acquire competencies that ensure the integrity of the local society (Csányi, 2005).

Social inclusion in community education institutions

The community-based functioning of institutions can be understood as social innovation. This initiative is based on the new idea that institutions that take into account the needs of local society are more effective. The costs of applying this social innovation are relatively low, but the benefits for the institutions can be high. As Mária Arapovics and colleagues (2019, p. 7) write in their methodological guide, socially responsive institutions "actively involve the inhabitants of the municipality or part of the municipality in the definition, implementation and evaluation of their activities, which are incorporated into the documents that define the internal functioning of the institution". In other words, we can speak of a mode of operation where the opinions, ideas and needs of local residents and stakeholders are reflected at an institutionalised level in the everyday operation of a given cultural institution (Arapovics, Beke, Dóri & Tóth, 2019).

Cultural community development and socialisation can be envisaged in the following groups of institutions: (1) community cultural institutions, (2) museums and (3) libraries.

All actors involved in socially responsive approaches can benefit from working together, as the change in the way institutions operate can lead to better relationships with members of the local community(ies), higher quality and higher attendance programmes for their audiences, increased resources, and long-term sustainability. For communities, discovering and strengthening their local identity, experiencing active participation in planning and decision-making processes, and feeling a sense of achievement can be a positive change. As a result of such a process, the institution can expect a stronger emotional engagement of local people, the involvement of stakeholders in community decision-making processes, and a qualitative improvement in the quality of relationships and trust. The successful and fruitful cooperation and partnership of these three actors (institutions, communities, and the maintainer) can bring about long-term and sustainable change in the functioning of institutions (Arapovics, Beke, Dóri & Tóth, 2019).

The socially responsive approach is a method, a process and a goal, the methodological steps of which can be defined in 7 stages. The presentation and structure of the model and the seven steps are the same for all three types of institutions, taking into account their specificities and characteristics. According to the authors, the need to adapt to our changing world, to respond adequately to local needs and to be sustainable in the long term justifies the need to introduce the model. The principles of participatory management include openness, transparency, mutual respect, dialogue, honesty, reliability, and flexibility. The authors consider it important to mention that community participatory functioning is a shared learning process, whereby it is necessary to incorporate feedback, broad access, and long-term sustainability into everyday operations at the institutional level (Arapovics, Beke, Dóri & Tóth, 2019).

Cultural community development

„The focus of the goals and methods of cultural community development is the community and its existing and potential cultural values" (Arapovics, 2016, p. 48). Activation can also be based on the local identity, attachments, and cultural interests of communities. The creation and preservation of cultural value provides an opportunity to organise colourful programmes in the community development process. By recognising and incorporating customs (festivals, events, programmes, products) and networks of links previously institutionalised in local society, it is possible to involve communities effectively in the functioning of community institutions. For example, the cultural community development method can be used to preserve local festive culture and to create new community institutions and customs. It is also important to stress that the organisation and operation of local cultural communities (e.g. film and book clubs, workshops, museum friendship circles, amateur dance and drama groups, choirs, study groups, associations, folk schools) is in itself a value-creating development (Arapovics, 2016). *„I call – in a narrow sense – cultural community development a process that strengthens community identity, or community self-activity, aimed at developing the capacity to create cultural value,*

protect values, to preserve or create traditions, which can promote, strengthen or 'prepare' the way for a longer-term community development process in a municipality or part of a municipality" (Arapovics, 2016, p. 49).

Research Methodology

In this paper, the focus of my research is on the relationship between community cultural institutions and community development. In my doctoral dissertation, I also address the concept and historical background of community cultural institutions and the possibilities of socially embedded functioning of these institutions. In the course of the empirical work and analysis, I will present here the differences of opinion on the relationship between community cultural institutions and community development.

Within the framework of my doctoral research, which is also the basis of this study, I have conducted twelve semi-structured expert interviews with community developers, consultants, legislators, and representatives of the community cultural institutions system who are all well acquainted with the community education institutional system and are currently active in the field. I divided the interviewees into three broad groups based on the interview experiences: (1) community development practitioners currently active in the field, (2) authors of the Community Education Act and the amendment, (3) representatives of the community cultural system (heads of institutions, consultants, experts from the National Institute for Culture). It is important to note that these groups are based on the answers to the questions and do not represent the actual positions and roles of the experts in the institutions.

Each semi-structured expert interview consisted of three major blocks of questions, which, in line with the research questions, aimed to explore the concept of public education (content, purpose, role), the institutional system and the potential for developing local social capital, and the relationship between community development and the community cultural institutions. The interviewees were selected on the basis of their outstanding expertise. Although the research is entirely self-funded and self-supported, I have endeavoured to ensure that the interviews are as diverse as possible, covering a broad spectrum of the profession. To this end, I visited community education institutions in several rural municipalities, conducted online interviews with professionals working in remote municipalities across the country, and spoke to several representatives of the National Institute for Culture. The processing and analysis of the expert interviews is based on a thematic review of the most recent texts.

The concept of community development in the expert interviews

I divided the interviewees into two broad groups based on their responses to the concept and definition of community development. The first group includes respondents who believe that community development is (or should be) an autonomous profession that has evolved from the former profession of cultural manager and is present in all institutions and municipalities. Community developers who seek to build partnerships across institutions believe that it is a profession that can respond flexibly to local needs and build on local resources to enable

community members to take ownership of their problems.

„Everywhere [there is room for community development]. So, it permeates the whole [municipality]. It could be a way of thinking, an approach, from which sometimes specific professional steps have to be taken [...] I find it hard to imagine a place where community development has no role at all."

(community developer)

„Actually, community development also started within community education, and over time, in a couple of years, it became independent..."

(former lawmaker, community education specialist)

The interviews also show that community development practitioners believe that this separate profession has evolved from the former profession of cultural manager, along with many other social professions (social work, supervision, event management, etc.). Thus, cultural management and public education have become closely intertwined over time, with many people working in the public education system having turned to community development before the change of regime.

The interviews suggest that the older generation is more inclined to see community development as a profession in its own right. It is also interesting to note that there are respondents from the public education sector who consider community development to be a profession in its own right, but that this profession is presented in a very different way in the public education sector. In the past, it was typical for cultural managers working in community cultural institutions to try to figure out what services the institution should offer its audience. However, the application of community development methodology has made it possible to organise programmes that respond to local needs, involving members of the communities. My former interviewee is not sure that the current professionals working in community education institutions would be able to implement such a deliberative process.

„I think that classical community development has or should have a very serious role, just as the mothers and fathers of community development think, but whether the professionals there [working in community cultural institutions] will be able to do it, I don't know." [...] „The service character is a big problem because it's not about services, it's about thinking together, acting together, talking together, having a dialogue, what should be, how it should be, and what can we do together. A high level of involvement."

(former lawmaker, community education specialist)

This quote leads us to the insights of the second group of interviewees. A significant number of the interviewees believe that community development has not been able to become a profession in its own right in Hungary in the last 30-40 years. They see the reasons for this, among others, in the structure and history of Hungarian society and in the specificities of the system of the community cultural institutions. They believe that community development as a method should be applied in community cultural institutions. This may also imply that in the current training of professionals in the field of public education, community development appears as a method alongside, for example, event organisation.

„I teach community development as a methodology all the time, and I think it should be in the methodology of community cultural professionals, whether it's community development or community building. [...] Community development has not been able to become an independent profession in Hungary. I think that there is no social justification for this, because here public education is an extremely strong community-based institutional system, so it could use this as a method."

(a representative of the community education institutions)

Based on the expert interviews, I concluded that the current system of community cultural institutions sees community development not as a way to launch and support grassroots initiatives, but rather as a way to use existing communities and relationships to achieve the institution's goals. I see a relatively sharp dividing line between classical community development and cultural community development. Some experts have argued that the current community development processes in institutions are far from helping local advocacy, but rather use the method to support the cultural programmes implemented by the community cultural institution and the socially embedded functioning of the institution. Another interviewee believes that the classic methodology of community development has outlived its time and that it is important to note that, unlike community development, the community cultural institutions can provide a permanent professional in the municipality.

„[...] to give the professional to the municipality; somewhere community development does not do that. I think that the community development movement started as a very good initiative, but its time is over. It may be a bit offensive, but its time is over, it's not needed like that anymore."

(a representative of the community education institutions)

During the interviews, the changes in the training of professionals in the field of public education were also mentioned several times. My experts mentioned that, although many of them consider community development as a profession in its own right, they perceive and understand the tendency for public education professionals to encounter community development as a mere method in their studies. In the 120-hour training course for community community cultural

institutions, prospective professionals encounter community development in the context of other methods. Community development practitioners consider this to be insufficient and do not consider it appropriate to mix different professions. On the contrary, representatives of the community cultural institutions system believe that community development is needed as a method, which is only part of the repertoire of public education professionals.

> *"[Public education training] cannot be done in 120 hours. And if we combine it with public development, so to say that today we can do community development and community education in 120 hours, I think it's a bit exaggerated."*
>
> (community developer)

> *"[Public education professionals] use [community development] as a tool to make the institution work socially, but they cannot think with a community development strategic brain."*
>
> (community developer)

However, there are experts among those I interviewed who believe that the role of community cultural institutions and community development can be different in each municipality. It is possible to imagine a situation in a municipality or institution where the work and assistance of a professional community development practitioner may be needed. However, there is not necessarily a case for a community cultural institution to carry out community development activities on a permanent basis.

> *„[...] and when and where else community development emerges as a profession in its own right, when and where its specific tools and methods appear in their work. It may or may not appear here, and I dare say that it is not necessarily a problem that it does not appear all the time, but there may be situations, for example, there may be situations in municipalities [...] that will certainly require a community development process."*
>
> (community education professional)

To sum up, I found two very extreme points of view during the interviews. The biggest difference I found was in the perception of community development in the country, including whether it can be seen as a separate profession. However, it is also worth highlighting the common points: almost all my interviewees said that there is a need for community development, community building and social institutions. The differences of emphasis are in the application of community development and the creation of conditions for it. According to community development practitioners, community cultural institutions are a very important element in a multi-stakeholder process in which these institutions play a key role in creating the conditions for local development. Conversely, institutionalists believe that the community development method can be used as a tool to serve the objectives of community cultural institutions.

Differences of opinion - the relationship between community cultural institutions and community development

In the last part of my study, I will try to highlight the differences of opinion that exist in the relationship between the institutional system of public education and community development. Without claiming to be exhaustive, it can be said that the representatives of classical community development have difficulty accepting the concept of cultural community development. As one of my interviewees pointed out, community development practitioners are perplexed by this narrow understanding of their profession. They do not deny that there is a community cultural institution in the municipalities and they see it as a common goal to improve the municipality for the betterment of the community members living there, but they would like to have more freedom to work on the ground in these institutions even if, according to other experts, this is less effective than development in the institutions. According to some interviewees, in Hungary, it is not primarily complex community development processes that are taking place in the municipalities, but rather development through the tools of cultural institutions, building on cultural foundations.

> *„[...] community developers cannot deal with this narrow understanding of community development, or it [such activities carried out by community education institutions] is not really considered community development."*
>
> (former lawmaker, community education specialist)

According to experts, there is a strange relationship between community development and the institutional system of public education. Many said it is increasingly difficult to find links between institutions and community developers. However, the atmosphere of suspicion is not beneficial to either side, and the two parallel worlds operating side by side can often hinder the effectiveness of the local development programmes that are being implemented. This phenomenon was brought to my attention by several experts during interviews.

> *„I think [community developers and community cultural institutions] have a suspicious relationship with each other, with prejudices and reservations on both sides. [...] In fact, community development is an interprofessional activity."*
>
> (community developer)

From the interviews, we can see that community developers and representatives of the community cultural institutional system think of institutions in very different ways. The former see the community cultural institution as a roof over the community. Its role is to provide a framework and opportunities for community activities. It provides professional assistance to encourage civic activity and participation, to build self-determined communities, without controlling or influencing the programmes that take place there. It is also responsible for identifying local resources and using them to respond flexibly to unexpected crises. It empowers people to act

together and to achieve their own goals. In this sense, a community cultural institution works for the benefit of local communities.

According to the representative of the community cultural institutional, the primary task of the institutions is to create and professionally support active, cultural communities in as many municipalities as possible. They use community development to support their own programmes, putting communities at the service of the institutions. It is the role of community education professionals to find common interests and provide activities for community members. The institutional system provides the conditions for community cultivation and for the dissemination and transfer of culture. In this reading, therefore, the institutions feel empowered to thematise and organise the activities of local communities.

The following table summarises the differences of opinion between the concepts of community cultural institutions and community development.

Table 1: Differences of opinion between the concepts of ccommunity cultural institutions and community development based on expert interviews

	According to community development experts...	**According to community education experts...**
Community development	Community development is an **autonomous profession** that has evolved from cultural management, and its representatives move freely within community cultural institutions (also), using their infrastructure and network of contacts to achieve community goals. This **specialised activity is needed everywhere,** and communities themselves develop and maintain the social institutions that suit their interests.	Community development is **a method** used by community education professionals to ensure the success of programmes in the institution (e.g. community survey, school report). community cultural institutions are generally engaged in **cultural community development,** based on local identity and a broad sense of culture. The institutional system supports the delivery of these **community events.**
The community cultural institution system	The community cultural institution is just a **roof over the community.** Its role is to provide **a framework and an opportunity** for community activity. It provides professional assistance to encourage **civic activity and participation** and to build **communities of initiative.** It identifies local resources and uses them to **respond flexibly** to unexpected crises. **It empowers** people to act together and achieve their own goals.	The primary task of the community cultural institutions is to create and professionally support **education, and active** communities in as many municipalities as possible. community cultural institutions call on community development to **support their own programmes.** The role of public education professionals is to find **common interests** and **provide activities** for community members. The institutional system provides the conditions for **public education** and for the **dissemination and transfer of culture.**

Source: *own ed.*

Summary

In my study, after clarifying the main theoretical concepts related to my doctoral research and presenting some of the research questions and methodology, I analysed the expert interviews in order to explore the relationship between the institutional system of public education and community development. Overall, community development practitioners tend to view community development as a profession in its own right, rather than as a profession within the institutional system. It is also interesting to note that, in my view, there is a tendency for community development to be seen as a modality, at the level of professional skills, in the institutional system of public education and in the training of public education professionals. Based on the expert interviews, I see that there is also not a complete consensus among the interviewees on the role of community development. Some see it as a comprehensive, cross-institutional approach that is needed everywhere, while others see it more as a way of running community events and socialising institutions.

I have seen a similar contradiction with the role of community cultural institutions. Community development practitioners believe that the community education institution is „just" a roof over the community, with an infrastructure to help local communities develop, and a flexible response to local needs. However, according to the representatives of the institutional system, the aim of the institutional system is rather to promote culture and to support local communities organised around culture. In many cases, community development methods are used by community education professionals in the institutions to achieve this goal.

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05

Krisztina Kolozsvári – Péter Pillók

Perception of the EU Among Young People

Introduction

In 2022, a pan-European goal is set for young people to acquire the skills and participate in programmes that will strengthen youth participation in building the future, creating a green, inclusive and digital European Union (European Commission, 2021), through cooperation between Member States, regional and local authorities. In this article, in line with the theme of the fourth (current) issue of the journal, we use data from the Századvég Consortium's questionnaire-based public opinion survey and a brief overview of qualitative research on the future of the European Union to present young people's views on the EU, its activities and crisis management, institutional trust and advocacy, and the vision of the European Union.

Methodology and sample composition

Between 3 January and 14 February 2022, the Századvég Consortium conducted a representative, large-sample survey of 30,000 people in 30 countries across Europe.[1] The survey was conducted using the CATI method[2], interviewing randomly selected adults. The sample is representative of gender, age group and region in each country. Our aim here is not to analyse differences between countries but to present the views of young people in the EU as a whole. The aggregated results are presented weighted by country population.

49% of respondents were male and 51% female. Four age categories have been created to report the results: 10% of respondents aged 18-24, 9% of respondents aged 25-29, 9% of respondents aged 30-34, while 72% of respondents were over 34.

Perception of the European Union, and the evaluation of its activities

The perception of the European Union is positive, both for the EU and for Hungary, and in fact, since 2007, the EU has had the highest level of support among citizens (European Parliament, 2021). Opinions are divided among the Hungarian population, but here too there is a perceptible move towards the West. While the 18-24 and 25-29 age groups are more positive towards the EU, pessimism is becoming more pronounced as age increases, especially among those aged 34 and over.

The perception of the European Union's action has been measured by several questions in several policy areas, three of which are highlighted here. The first question concerned the evaluation of economic activity.

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[1] Data for the European Union, the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Norway are included in this survey.

[2] Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing

This was followed by an assessment of the European Union's migration policy and its action on nature and climate protection. The results show a clear middle ground, with all age groups equally tending to rate the EU's activities as good, while younger people were the most positive in all three assessments. It is interesting to note that not only young people but even members of older age groups are highly negative when it comes to evaluating the EU's action on migration.

There is no doubt that there is a civic perception that the European Union has clear economic responsibilities and tasks: not only does it have the power to protect economic interests and manage crises, but it also has the capacity to represent citizens' rights and interests and to build a well-functioning democracy.

On the basis of the satisfaction index (Table 1), it appears that those who rate the European Union's performance poorly – and here we are talking particularly about those aged 34 and over – are less satisfied, while those who rate the EU more positively – in this case, 18-29 year olds – are more satisfied with the European Union.

Table 1: EU satisfaction index (by age groups)

Age of respondent in categories	Average	Sample size	Deviation
18–24 years old	3.5	2828	1.77088
25–29 years old	3.2	2639	1.89298
30–34 years old	3.1	2517	2.01775
Above 34-years-old	2.7	22020	2.05460
Total sample	2.9	30003	2.03248

***Source:** Századvég edited*

The causes of pessimism and dissatisfaction may be the subject of further investigation, but it is not the purpose of this article to explore causality. Nevertheless, there is a broad consensus among young and older people on the need to simplify and make the functioning of the European Union more transparent (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Simplifying and making the work of the EU more transparent (by age group, %)

Do you agree or disagree with the following? The functioning of the European Union should be simplified and made more transparent

	Agree	Disagree	DK/Refused
Above 34	84,90%	8,20%	6,80%
30–34 years old	74,30%	16,50%	9,30%
25–29 years old	71,50%	18,60%	10,00%
18–24 years old	64,90%	23,70%	11,40%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Source: *Századvég edited*

Institutional trust and advocacy

In addition to evaluating the European Union's activities, the research also looked at how much the average citizen trusts the EU as an institution, whether they feel their interests and rights are well represented and, finally, how much of an impact bureaucracy has.

A recurring issue at the EU level is the extent to which the EU institutions can and should be reformed – with serious political and policy implications.

The survey results show a clear middle ground in terms of institutional trust: 17% of respondents trust the European Union completely, 52% somewhat and 27% not at all. This distrust increases with age, although this is not surprising when looking at the responses to the question on the representation of interests, where older people – those aged 34 and over – tend to think that their interests are not represented in Brussels (55%). It is interesting to note that although young people have a higher level of confidence, they also have a strong view that their interests are not well represented in Brussels: 49% of 18-24 year olds say they are well represented in Brussels and 37% say they are not well represented, compared to 45% and 43% respectively for 25-29 year olds.

The majority of respondents (53%) believe that there is a double standard in the European Union, meaning that countries are not treated equally.

The existence of double standards is strongly perceived even by the youngest (45% of 18-24 year olds, 47% of 25-29 year olds).

Across all age categories, there is strong agreement that the EU should reduce the amount of bureaucracy, money spent on it, and staff in Brussels: 53% of 18-24 year olds, 59% of 25-29 year olds, 68% of 30-34 year olds and 79% of 34+ year olds agree (Figure 2). Similarly, a relative majority of respondents – over 60% in all age groups – tended to agree with the statement that if there is a problem and Brussels does not act in time, Brussels leaders should take responsibility, and possibly resign.

Figure 2: Brussels bureaucracy in the European Union



Source: *Századvég edited*

Crisis management in the EU

In recent years, the European Union has been living in an „age of crises": in addition to the COVID-19 pandemic, the whole Union is facing an energy and climate crisis, sanctions and economic crisis due to the war between Russia and Ukraine, a migration crisis and a kind of identity crisis. There is no doubt that the group most affected by these crises is young people, who are less active participants in the policy-making process, but whose involvement is essential to the implementation of the proposals.

In answering our questions on the handling of the coronavirus outbreak and the statements on crisis management, it was clear that the majority of citizens almost expect the EU to have some competence to deal with crises. In general, the EU's fight against the COVID-19 pandemic is considered to be „good": 16% of 18-24 year olds rated the EU's action as excellent and 42% as good, while 25-29 year olds also tended to rate the EU's action as good (12% excellent and 41% good). The perception of the older age group is also rather negative on this question, with

46% of those aged 34 and over rating the EU's activities in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic as rather poor. The EU's vaccine procurement and vaccination programme is also good, with 15% of respondents rating it as excellent and 48% as good, with no significant differences between age groups.

EU citizens, including Hungarians, believe that the COVID-19 pandemic has serious economic and financial consequences. The main problems are price rises, inflation and difficulties in making a living. However, half of the respondents (50%) are optimistic that the economy will recover in the coming years and are confident about the future decisions of the European Union in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In parallel with the European Union's crisis management, it is worth discussing the problems that are particularly pressing for young people, not only at a national level, but also within the EU, and which should and must be addressed at the EU level. The most pressing issues include financial hardship and poverty, the state of the education system, climate change, unemployment and immigration. As an outlook, we show, based on the data of the large-scale youth survey, which are the most pressing issues in Hungary at the moment, for which we expect solutions at the EU level (Figure 3) (Székely, Pillók, Kántor, & Domokos, 2020).

Figure 3: Top ten problems affecting Youth in Hungary, 2020 (%)



Source: *Századvég edited, based on the results of the 2020 large sample youth survey*

Identity in the EU

In 2022, according to a Századvég research, the majority of respondents (74%) feel they belong to their own country first, and only then identify themselves as Europeans (Figure 4). This is hardly surprising, given that we all come from different backgrounds, have different life experiences and have been brought up in a cultural and ethnic environment that is very different from those around us.

Figure 4: Identity issue (by age group, %)



Source: *Századvég edited*

An individual's belonging and identity are first defined by family and close relationships and later expanded to include workplace, group and social identities. Social identity is „the mastered system of aspects of self-definition by which the individuals can identify themselves with many other like individuals as a member of certain social groups, thus satisfying the need to question their own existence and identity and allaying feelings of uncertainty arising from the unanswerability of this question" (Csepeli, 1984/3).

In the process of identification, one affiliation seems to be more important than the other, so it is not surprising that some people feel closer to Europe and others to their own country. Above all, it is necessary to emphasize that identification with the European Union will be strengthened when a conception of the nation is developed where we are open to the values of other nations and identify with the problems of others and make way for each other (Csepeli, 1984/3).

The future of the European Union

On the future of the European Union, the Századvég research looked at whether EU citizens think the European Union will exist in ten years, whether it will be better or worse for future generations, and how the economic situation will evolve. The responses clearly show that the average EU citizen is optimistic about the future of the EU: 62% of those polled think the EU

will still exist in ten years and only 22% think it will not. Compared to other countries, Hungarians are slightly more optimistic about the future of the EU.

A relative majority (42%) of respondents – young and old alike – are pessimistic about the future of the next generation, and only a quarter (22%) feel that despite the current crisis, future generations will be better off (Figure 5). Young people are also slightly more optimistic on this issue.

Figure 5: Future of the EU (by age group, %)

Do you think your children or future generations will...?

will live better than they do today
will live the same
will live worse off than they do today
DK/Refused

50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

18–24 years old: 33,2% 28,0% 33,9% 5,0%
25–29 years old: 25,5% 29,7% 39,0% 5,8%
30–34 years old: 22,3% 30,5% 41,8% 5,4%
Above 34: 20,6% 26,1% 43,4% 9,9%

***Source:** Századvég edited*

EU citizens are the most pessimistic about the EU economy: 45% of respondents think the economy will weaken, another 27% feel the situation is stagnating and only 23% are confident the economy will grow. Given the current crisis and the fact that the most pressing problem cited by young people today is uncertainty and an unpredictable future, this result is not surprising.

However, it is interesting to note that despite the pessimism and dissatisfaction, 65% of respondents in a referendum on EU membership are strongly in favour of remaining in the EU, and only 26% would support leaving. Looking at time-series data over the last six years, this shows no significant change, and there is no significant difference by age group (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Referendum on EU membership (by age group, %)



Source: *Századvég edited*

The Conference on the Future of Europe

In this chapter, we briefly present the results of another – qualitative – study related to the topic presented so far.

In 2021 and 2022, young people will be a priority target group for EU strategies. This kind of initiative to shape the future together, as EU citizens, has given birth to a unique conference on 9 May 2022. The Conference on the Future of Europe in Strasbourg was the first step in an innovative process, where participants (academics, elected representatives, and civil society) from all over Europe shared ideas on key issues and challenges and helped shape a common future, regardless of their profession, place of residence or gender.

"The Conference on the Future of Europe is a citizens-focused, bottom-up exercise for Europeans to have their say on what they expect from the European Union. It will give citizens a greater role in shaping the Union's future policies and ambitions, improving its resilience" (European Parliament, European Council, European Commission, 2022). The conference not only serves to strengthen social inclusion but is also a unique initiative to bring real citizen input

into decision-making processes. Looking back in history, there have been very few instances of effective direct involvement of citizens in the process.

Although it is not yet known what the actions to be taken by the implementing institutions will be, we can say that the innovative initiative is quite impulsive and credible, even if only in the sense that priorities have emerged that were already mentioned in the EU evaluation and in the outline of the youth problem map. These priorities are: combating climate change and tackling environmental challenges, strengthening the economy, creating social justice and equality, digital transformation of Europe, preserving and promoting our European values, improving the image of the EU and strengthening the democratic foundations of the Union (Figure 7).

Figure 7: Conference on the Future of Europe (Infographic)

Source: *own editing based on Európa Pont, 2022*

[3] https://europapont.blog.hu/2022/06/13/az_eu_jovoje_konferencia (Accessed: 13/12/2022)

Summary

The European Year of Youth will target young people and offer them awareness-raising events, opportunities and grants that can help them tackle the issues that affect them and increase their involvement in decision-making. It is important that young citizens, both at home and in the EU, are informed and have an identity of belonging to the EU through benefiting from EU funding.

The results of our research strongly suggest that young people are a key group in the current crises, making their participation in decision-making processes indispensable. Young and old alike feel that the European Union will exist in ten years and that, at the same time, it has the competencies to tackle crises.

In several EU countries, there is a strong belief in the need to set development paths and actively involve young people. At the same time, the responses underline the need for clearly realistic objectives that do not impose a heavy burden on citizens.



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

06

Levente Székely

Should we compromise?

Two decades of large-scale youth research on the scales

Introduction

The history of youth research in Hungary did not begin in the last two decades, but the turn of the millennium brought an important change with the establishment of the National Institute for Youth Research[1], which launched a large-scale youth research programme. The questionnaire-based research surveyed young people aged 15-29 years in Hungary using a sample of 8,000, and the results were published in the form of a flash report (Szabó et al., 2002), a volume of studies (Laki et al., 2001) accompanied by a CD. The Ifjúság2000 (Youth 2000) survey was an important milestone, as it was able to provide a comprehensive experience of the changes that have taken place among young people in the decade since the change of regime, based on a large sample. The following year, MOZAIK2001, a survey of young Hungarians aged 15-29 living across the border and their ethnic majority in the same region, was carried out, interviewing 5,500 Hungarians and 2,000 ethnic majority youth in the five regions.

The next in the series, Ifjúság2004 (Youth 2004), focused on young people's attitudes towards people with disabilities. The results of the research were presented in a flash report (Bauer–Szabó, 2005) and a situation analysis was prepared for the National Youth Strategy (Bauer et al., 2017).

The 2008 large sample data collection was based on qualitative (focus group) research, with the questionnaire focusing on political socialisation. The 2008 survey resulted in a flash report (Bauer–Szabó, 2009) and a volume of studies summarising the experiences of the previous data collection waves (2000, 2004, 2008) (Bauer–Szabó, 2011).

As in the previous studies, the 2008 survey was carried out by the National Youth Research Institute[2], which had undergone several organisational changes in the meantime, and was continued by Társadalomkutató Kft. and Kutatópont Kft. after its dissolution. The 2012 survey was conducted under this new structure under the name Magyar Ifjúság 2012 (Hungarian Youth 2012). The new organisation has also given impetus to a more detailed presentation of the results. Using the data from the 2012 research, four volumes of studies were published in addition to the flash report (Székely, 2013; Nagy–Székely, 2014a; Nagy–Székely, 2014b; Nagy–Székely, 2016).

The 2016 and 2020 research waves, although under a new name[3], have been prepared along the lines of previous large-scale youth research (Ifjúság2000-2008; Magyar Ifjúság 2012; MOZAIK2001-2011), in a comparable way with the results of previous research.

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1 In the 1999 budget, funds were earmarked for the first time to support youth research. This, together with the funds allocated by the 2000 budget law, created the opportunity to launch large-scale youth research (Nagy - Szeifer, 2016).

2 From 2005, it was called the Mobility Youth Research Office and later the Children and Youth Research Department within the National Institute for Family and Social Policy of the NCSSCI.

3 Magyar Ifjúság Kutatás 2016, Magyar Ifjúság Kutatás 2020 or Magyar Fiatalok 2020 (Hungarian Youth Research 2016 and Hungarian Youth Research 2020 or Hungarian Youth 2020).

The 2016 and 2020 research waves were accompanied by a research on Hungarian youth living outside Hungary's borders, which was conducted along the same thematic and time-frame as the Hungarian research. In 2016 and in the 2020 research, 12,000 15-29-year-olds were interviewed, and in addition to the 8,000 Hungarian young people in Hungary, 4,000 Hungarian young people living outside Hungary's borders were interviewed, thus providing a comprehensive picture of Hungarian youth in the Carpathian Basin. In the regions with the largest Hungarian communities beyond the borders, the data collection was coordinated with the Hungarian survey (at the same time and along the same lines). In Transylvania (including Partium, Szeklerland and Inner Transylvania), 2,000 people were interviewed, in in the historic region of Upper Hungary 1,000, in Vojvodina and Ukrainian Subcarpathia 500-500, 2017; Székely–Szabó, 2018) and two volumes of studies (Székely, 2018a; Nagy, 2018), while the 2020 research has so far resulted in two flash reports (Domokos et al., 2021a; Domokos et al., 2021b) and three volumes of studies (Székely, 2021a; Nagy, 2022; Pillók–Székely, 2022).[4] During the six waves of the large-scale youth survey launched at the turn of the millennium, a total of 48,000 young people aged 15-29 were interviewed in Hungary. In the following pages, I will briefly review this work, the lessons learned from the research and possible future perspectives.

Dynamics of the thematic

During the 20 years of large-scale youth research, we have been confronted with a number of dilemmas, mainly related to thematic issues. It is only natural that the development of the questionnaire should justify updating the set of questions in light of the experience of previous results and new knowledge. However, when thinking in terms of a research programme and not as a stand-alone research, new approaches often come up against the challenge of investigating trends. In the battle of trends versus actualities, on a comparing apples to apples basis, trends have usually prevailed in the experience to date. This means that, in most cases, when a particular issue was included in the questionnaire, researchers tried to follow up on the topic by formulating the question in a way that was methodologically adapted to the question used previously.

A comparison of the number of questions in the questionnaire for each topic can tell us a lot about the cornerstones that the researchers felt were important in the design of the research. A comparison of the questionnaires in the research series shows a range of 161 to 319 questions (Table 1). However, when comparing the question numbers of the whole questionnaire, it is quite difficult to draw conclusions because the structure of the questions (can be) very different. A simple yes/no question can be asked in a fraction of a minute, while a table with many sub-questions can take many minutes to complete.

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[4] The methodological specification of the research abroad was prepared by the research team in cooperation with the Max Weber Foundation (Transylvania), the II. Rákóczi Ferenc Kárpátaljai Magyar Főiskola (Ferenc Rákóczi II Hungarian College of Carpathian Basque Country) (Ukrainian Subcarpathia), the Identitás Kisebbségkutató Műhely (Identity Minority Research Workshop) (Vojvodina) in 2016, the László Szekeres Foundation (Vojvodina) in 2020, and the Institute for National Policy Research.

To get an idea of how the total length of the questionnaire has changed over the data collection period, we can start with the estimation of the time needed to complete the questionnaire by the interviewer and the length of the questionnaire recorded by the data collection system after the 2012 survey.

For the last two surveys, the recorded data were 43 minutes (average survey time in 2020 for Hungary) and 41 minutes (2016). The 2012 recorded data for the data collection system was 70 minutes, while interviewers conducted interviews (based on their own administration) averaging 66 minutes in 2008, but no such data are available for previous waves.[5]

The other option is to look at the number of sub-questions, so-called items[6], in each database. If we actually count the items from the first question asked to the interviewees to the last, we find that the last four waves have adjusted the length of the questionnaire and that about 1000 items have been added to the databases in each case. It can be seen that the number of questions and the number of items are only loosely related; the order of the shortest questionnaires is even reversed if we sort by the number of items instead of the number of questions (Table 1).

Table 1: Number of questions and items

Data recording waves	Number of questions	Number of items
2000	161	824
2004	235	772
2008	319	1019
2012	272	1055
2016	237	955
2020	246	965

The number of items is also not a perfect tool for determining the length of a questionnaire, as it does not always correspond to the number of items in an interview that actually contain a survey response, there are a number of so-called filter or condition questions, which will not always be part of the interview. For example, if we were to ask someone about their job, we would first have to ask if they work at all.

5 The 2000 and 2004 survey documentation does not include data on interview time, nor does the questionnaire include such a question. It is difficult to imagine, however, that interview time was not recorded; the 2004 study focused on the effect of questionnaire length on interview quality. This is evidenced, for example, by the questions asked of the interviewer: „At how many questions did the interviewee get tired or bored of answering?"

6 It is worth comparing the number of items by bringing the datasets into common denominator, by excluding the different variables trained and by ignoring the interviewer's questions before and after the interview.

According to the 2020 data, just over half of young people in Hungary are active in the labour market, but almost half are not. For them, these questions are not only irrelevant but also confusing, so they are naturally not asked in the interviews – but they are included in the questionnaire and appear as items.

However, in the large sample survey, we also worked with split samples (in 2004, 2008, 2016 and 2020), which means that different questionnaire scenarios were asked on several – representative – samples. In practice, all the people in the sample answer the questions about their current relationship, but only some of them are asked by the interviewers about their opinion of the different types of relationships. Of course, the selection cannot be arbitrary, the different questionnaire scenarios are matched to achieve roughly the same interview length for each scenario. A clear disadvantage of this approach is that it is limited in terms of the number of questions that can be asked in a purely subsample. They can be compared with the main sociodemographic variables and many others, but the scenarios cannot be linked. So, for example, it is possible to examine how those who think one way or another about the forms of relationships think about their role models, but none of these can be examined in terms of how they think about the contrasts within society. This is because the latter was asked on a different sub-sample than the family relationships and role models questionnaire, so these items cannot be examined together.[7]

The first attempt to use a split sample was made in 2004 (there was a block of 4,000 respondents), and in 2008 the four-times 2,000 sample system, still used in 2020, was developed, which allowed the questionnaire to be considerably longer. The use of sub-samples is a consequence of the increasing reduction in the time that respondents can endure in a questionnaire survey. As attention spans dwindle more and more quickly and interviews are interrupted more and more frequently, we have tried to keep the questionnaire[8] as short as possible and as complete as possible.

Since its inception, the Large Sample Survey on Youth has been designed to provide a comprehensive picture of young people aged 15-29. To paint this picture, it is necessary to look in depth at life situation and lifestyle issues, which leads to many topics and, in practice, even more questions and long questionnaires. But to get a complete and comprehensive picture, we need even more, because youth is a specific period of life in which we finish school, start working, get paid for the first time for our work, leave our parents, choose a partner and start a family. These life events are key to entering independent adulthood, but learning about adulthood involves asking fundamental questions that go beyond the present to reveal aspirations and intentions for the future.

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7 There are methods to use imputed databases to investigate issues that were not included in a questionnaire, but there are a number of limitations.

8 Writing a really good questionnaire seems to be an impossible task because a good questionnaire is simple, but it can be used to investigate complex relationships, it is short, but it takes into account all possible and important aspects, and it is a pleasure for the respondent, as well as providing accurate and detailed data about the respondents.

The themes covered in the questionnaire[9] include four priority areas, which were much more prominent than average in each of the previous waves. These are: basic demographic variables; issues related to starting a family and having children; school and labour market paths; and social well-being and politics. The emphasis is due to the importance and complexity of the topics, the fact that these are the topics that this research explores most extensively (e.g. addiction research is more concerned with health and risk behaviour) and finally, the identification of the topics to be studied is not only a researcher's competence but also a client's competence, i.e. these are the topics that are of most interest to the client. Looking at the larger thematic units of the questionnaires used in each wave (Table 2), we can observe that the weight of each topic varied from wave to wave. A more detailed analysis also shows that since the turn of the millennium, the most significant increase in the number of questions has been in the area of digital culture, while the most visible decrease is seen in the area of risk behaviours, with a particular decline in the number of questions on drug use (Székely, 2020).

Table 2: Topics with question numbers

Topic	2000	2004	2008	2012	2016	2020
Demography, life events, starting a family	16	41	36	49	37	41
School life path	10	21	45	27	24	25
Labour market pathways	24	24	46	46	31	26
Social well-being, politics	29	23	32	23	29	38
Household, housing, finances	31	41	40	28	20	17
Leisure, sport, health	20	31	54	42	21	21
Culture, (new)media	18	19	28	27	33	27
Values, identity, religion	9	10	9	12	20	18
Updates, other	4	13	20	10	15	26
Questions for the interviewers	0	12	9	8	7	7
Total	**161**	**235**	**319**	**272**	**237**	**246**

[9] The delimitation of topics may not be perfectly clear-cut, there are questions that can be grouped into several sub-topics, and there are summary topics that could be grouped together, or even a single topic could be split into several sub-topics.

The number of questions alone cannot show how much the content of the thematic units, the way questions are asked, etc. has changed.[10] The 2020 survey also used recurring elements, e.g. a question based on Inglehart's (1997) value assessments, as well as new questions that were formulated by the experts who proposed them during the professional consultation, e.g. questions on volunteering or youth programmes, and some changes were required by the current situation, such as the inclusion of questions on the COVID-19 pandemic.

The current large sample survey of young people aims to meet both the need for a comprehensive approach and the need for comparability. It is expected by policy-makers and youth professionals to be able to provide a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the situation and lifestyles of young people. The 2020 survey, like the 2016 survey, should not only serve to get to know young Hungarians in Hungary[11] but also young Hungarians across the borders, and should be able to be compared with previous large-scale youth surveys in Hungary and across the borders.[12] All this had to be taken into account in the design by examining the areas of interest as set out in the tender documents[13] and by focusing on the suggestions of the clients and external experts. This multi-pronged approach was sought to be consistently reflected in the theme of the 2020 Hungarian questionnaire (Figure 1).

[10] For a detailed analysis of the research themes between 2000-2016, see Székely, 2020.

[11] The questionnaires abroad are based on the themes of the Hungarian questionnaire and are identical to the Hungarian questionnaire in terms of trend questions. In addition to the trend questions, the questionnaires abroad also contain a common block of questions for the foreign region, which is not included in the questionnaire in the home country and can only be interpreted in the foreign regions. This block of questions contains almost exclusively questions related to identity, which tries to relate to the overall theme, thus dealing with the individual's connections to the local Hungarian community, the majority society, and Hungary. In addition to subjective attitudes, it mainly examines language use, from the school system to everyday practice and content consumption.

[12] The questions used in the questionnaire are based on the previous waves (Ifjúság2000; Ifjúság2004; Ifjúság2008; Magyar Ifjúság 2012; MOZAIK2001 and MOZAIK2011), the themes of the questionnaires were designed to be comparable with previous research and to allow for the identification of trends. In addition to the large-scale youth survey, we have also taken into account the solutions of the following research studies: ESPAD survey series; HBSC survey series; YRBS 2013; ESS survey series; EVS survey series; Az ifjúság életkörülményei kutatás (Youth Living Conditions Survey) KSH, 1996; Ifjúságkutatás (Youth Survey), 1991.

[13] The 2016 and 2020 waves were completed under the EFOP-1.2.3-VEKOP-15-2015-00001 priority project.

Figure 1: Topics of the 2020 Hungarian questionnaire

Living situation (trend)	Social reproduction (partly trend)	Lifestyle (partly trend)
• Demographic characteristics • Educational and labour market situation and plans • Wealth and subjective income situation • Family and household characteristics	• Life events • Starting a family and having children • Plans and attitudes (influencing factors)	• Culture and media consumption • Leisure and sport • Health and risk behaviour • Problem map • Political activity and ideology • Identity and religion
Integration	**Digital culture**	**Visions for the future**
• Communities, social distances • Volunteering • Services and needs	• Access and use • Online harassment • Game	• Sustainability • Visions for the future • Fears
Interviewer's questions	**Questions about the coronavirus pandemic**	
• Basic information about the question • Questions to the interviewers		

The life situation blocks included basic demographic trend questions, which are also included in previous surveys and which are usually part of all surveys (gender, age, place of residence, education, labour market activity). Similar to the demographic questions, we also examined the questions of work, unemployment, working abroad; education (studying abroad), income and wealth, in a comparable way to previous waves of research. In the block of questions dealing with learning, in addition to the precise recording of the educational career and level of qualification, a new element was the nature of the institution (provider), the experience with talent management and catch-up programmes, and the perception of the teachers. Questions were also asked about the level and use of language skills. As in previous waves, we also looked at learning plans, including those for studying abroad. In questions on work, we sought to explore work experiences to date. The questionnaire included questions on employment conditions, perceptions of job security, experience of unemployment, circumstances (facts and attitudes) that help job search and job placement, and career hopes. In this section, we have looked in more detail at experiences and plans for working abroad, and the factors that encourage and

discourage working abroad. We also looked at the potential consequences of a labour-shortage economy, both in terms of overtime and new forms of activity. We have also formulated questions on income and wealth in order to understand the objective and subjective financial situation, including the presence of debts and savings in young people's lives. In addition, the use of financial services and financial autonomy from parents were also part of the block of questions. In relation to housing, housing conditions and satisfaction with them, household size and identification of relationships with household members, and plans to move out were the focus of the questions.

Questions on life events have been included in the questionnaire for several waves, where it is also possible to examine events experienced and plans for the future. In relation to 15-29 year olds, starting a family and having children is a priority area of investigation for the purposes of the research, and therefore the social reproduction questions are also mostly suitable for trend analysis. The questions in this area aim to describe the current situation as accurately as possible and to understand the plans for the future, partly by re-focusing the previous approach on the factors influencing and the need for assistance. In line with these two objectives, the current marital status, the type of relationship, the perception of marriage and related marriage plans were addressed. In the questionnaire, we looked in detail at the current and desired number of children, reasons for postponing/refusing to have children, attitudes towards starting a family, the related perception of the compatibility of family and work, and knowledge and use of youth and family benefits.

The lifestyle questions in the 2020 survey are grouped into six thematic units, which are also partly suitable for trend analysis, but the nature of the questions gives much more freedom to examine topicality. In the thematic area of culture and media consumption, we looked at the consumption of traditional media (electronic media and print media, as well as traditional books) and visits to cultural sites, as in previous practice. In leisure time, we looked at the amount of leisure time and leisure activities. Among the leisure activities, sporting habits were detailed, including an examination of the incentives to participate in sports. The health questions include a question on mental health, as previously used, while the module on risk behaviours covers the three areas of tobacco, alcohol and drugs (with a partially related question on gambling and adult content consumption). The aim of the module is to examine the extent of smoking and alcohol consumption, the presence of drug users in the network of contacts and the possibility of accessing drugs. The problem map collects young people's reflections on their own generation since the beginning of the research, so it was part of the questionnaire in 2020, with partly renewed content, and a separate volume was also produced on this topic (Pillók–Székely, 2022). In the context of political activity and ideology, we looked in detail at young people's political interests, the opportunities for youth participation and practices of participation. Along the lines of previous research waves, we examined satisfaction in several dimensions, including the state of the country, the functioning of democracy, and opinions on joining the European Union. This included an assessment of trust in social institutions and an examination of formal and informal relationships with organisations.

The details of identity were explored by looking at ethnicity and national identity. The questions on religion were essentially based on previous questionnaires, providing an opportunity for comparison.

The thematic unit on integration explored social distances and belonging to communities, largely using the same questions as before. Two major new blocks were added to the 2020 questionnaire, on volunteering (11 questions) and on youth services and needs (4 questions).

In the digital culture section, we included a section on the characteristics of the ownership and use of ICT tools, as well as an examination of the use of online social media and online gaming habits. In this section, we also looked at the perception of the importance of media. A new element that has emerged in the last wave is the issue of bullying, and within this, online bullying.

In the 2020 survey, there was a strong emphasis on the examination of visions, particularly in terms of environmental and sustainability aspects. In addition to the questions used previously to capture expectations for the future, the presence of fears about the future (climate change, pandemics, economic crisis, etc.) was also part of the questionnaire.

The postponement of the spring fieldwork enabled two broad questions on the coronavirus pandemic to be added at the end of the questionnaire, which sought to assess the impact of the pandemic situation.

Building on previous practice, some of the questions were asked in a self-completion block, covering risk behaviours (smoking, alcohol, drugs), national identity and political preference.

Sample size of 8000 and fieldwork

The methodological principles of sample selection in youth research have not changed since the turn of the millennium, thanks to the work of the distinguished mathematician-sociologist member of the research team, István Nemeskéri. In all cases, the aim was to ensure that the sample was representative of the target group in as many aspects as possible and that the results of the research would characterise young people aged 15-29 with as few errors as possible. The research samples were designed on the basis of similar criteria, according to the data and statistics available for each region.[14] The (implemented) samples are nationally representative of the 15-29 age group in the given survey year – i.e. they ensure the validity of the population proportions in the sample – by gender, age, education, type of municipality and region. One of the undisputed virtues of the survey is that all waves of the Youth Survey series, launched in 2000, are comparable and can be analysed longitudinally.

[14] Nemeskéri (2001) based the sample selection on the sub-regions and, in the case of Budapest, on the districts, with the aim of interviewing in each sub-region.

For the sample in Hungary, we used the data set of the Ministry of Interior[15] and its predecessors[16], which contained the number of men and women of the age group with valid residence and the number of inhabitants of the given age group per municipality, broken down by year of birth.

Sampling was done in several stages using a stratified probability sampling method. In the first stage, the municipalities to be surveyed were selected, and in the second stage, the addresses of the municipalities to be visited were selected. The primary sampling unit was a list of settlements in Hungary (PSU), and the secondary sampling unit was a list of young people aged 15-29 living in these settlements and having a permanent residence in Hungary at the time of sampling (SSU). In the first step, the settlements were stratified according to their geographical location and the number of young people living in the settlement, and then randomly sampled by stratum. In the second step, a random probability sample was selected from the address register database in the selected municipalities in proportion to the number of elements in each stratum to select those who were included in the sample.

During the 2008 survey, the good practice was developed to sample four samples of settlements (4x2000 inhabitants), which separately represent the settlement structure of the country by regional location and settlement size. In the sampled municipalities, the respondents were selected on the basis of two demographic criteria (sex and age) from the address register data. It is important to note that these are the two criteria that allow for sample selection, other criteria such as marital status, ethnicity, and education are not included in the address databases used for sample selection. Partly for this reason, education was taken into account in the multi-criteria mathematical weighting procedure to eliminate the small biases arising from sampling. As a result, the four sub-samples of 2,000 persons from the most recent waves, taken separately, and the pooled sample of 8,000 persons, are also representative of the 15-29 age group by sex, age, educational attainment, type of municipality and region.

The reason for using a sub-sample of 2,000 respondents is that the planned thematic would have increased the questionnaire's interviewing time to at least 60-70 minutes on average, but this would have clearly reduced the quality of the questionnaire, so the use of sub-samples for the Hungarian questionnaire reduced the questionnaire length and also the sample size along each question or set of questions. The schematic structure of each sub-sample and questionnaire was as follows (Table 3):

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[15] Previous: Central Office for Administrative and Electronic Public Services.

[16] It is worth noting that the use of address list searches is limited by the quality of the register data. The quality is not only affected by internal reasons (non-existent or wrong addresses due to transcription, updating), but also by the presence of data that are not recorded in the target youth population (e.g. living in a dormitory, in a rented house, with relatives). Real-life examples range from the young person living with parents (registered with grandmother to go to the preferred school), to the university student living in a sublet in a distant town, officially living with parents, but actually only coming home for holidays.

Table 3: Structure of the questionnaire by sub-sample

Common questions (basic survey data; trend questions; interviewer questions) N=8000			
"purple" block (N=2000): political socialisation	"yellow" block (N=2000): life events; labour market attitudes; territorial mobility, volunteering	"green" block (N=2000): starting a family – having children; health; leisure; environment; religion	"blue" block (N=2000): youth programmes; digital culture; consumer awareness; cultural consumption

It is important to note that the specific module structure of the questionnaire and the sub-samples adapted to it also have a strong influence on the possible directions of analysis, which is a clear limitation in the combined analysis of the two questions in two different blocks.

The latest data collection was carried out in a total of 12 weeks with 165 interviewers using the tablet-assisted personal interviewing (TAPI) method, mainly due to the specific circumstances of the coronavirus pandemic. The negative impact of the coronavirus pandemic is illustrated by the fact that the fieldwork took significantly longer in 2020 than in 2016, with three months instead of two months.

Summary and vision

In this paper, we have summarised a brief history of the large-scale youth research that started at the turn of the millennium, which shows that large-scale youth research is an outstanding research programme by international standards. Its uniqueness lies primarily in its sample size – thus the possibility of segmentation and deep drilling – and the possibility of trend analysis. In addition to providing detailed trend data, the large sample of youth research has also gained undisputed merit in testing the hypotheses of theoretical work. Over the past decades, two frameworks have emerged in the international literature that have provided interpretative frameworks for youth-related theoretical work, empirical research and, among them, international comparative studies. These two prominent thematic frameworks are the discourse of ‚transition' based on the presentation of life situations and the discourse of youth ‚culture' focusing on lifestyles (Szanyi, 2018).

Among the narratives that are more or less integrated into international discourses or are derived from them, but are specifically Hungarian, three major ones can be highlighted (Nagy - Tibori, 2016): the theory of youth epoch change (Gábor, 2004), the narrative of youth affairs (Nagy, 2013) and the paradigm of the new silent generation (Székely, 2014).[17]

[17] These theories do not talk about young people along the same dimensions: the youth narrative tries to answer who young people are, the new silent generation focuses on what they are like, while the theory of youth transition is mostly concerned with the why. At the same time, all models can be linked to international discourses, the youth transition is closely linked to the discourse of transition, while the narrative of youth is embedded in developmental approaches, and the concept of the new silent generation is formulated along the lines of generational theories.

The empirical testing of all three theoretical approaches is based on the results of large-scale youth research, which has provided empirical data for a number of academic and professional publications, in addition to the major theories, and has formed the basis for the situation analysis of the National Youth Strategy and other decision-preparatory documents.[18] The large-scale youth research is also a public good, since, in addition to the publications, the unprocessed results are also freely available, which is not at all self-evident in the case of similar research. For the last three waves (2012, 2016, 2020), access is organised and transparent. Nevertheless, the most vociferous criticism of the research has been made precisely in relation to the accessibility of the databases, criticising the way in which they are accessed and, even more so, the timing of access. This also points to the importance of research, regardless of whether the criticism itself is justified or not.[19] Some of the criticisms were explicitly not professionally based, but rather politically motivated, which, while drawing attention to the large-scale youth research, rather hindered the professional work and harmed the research. Over the two decades of its existence, large-scale youth research has repeatedly faced difficulties due to organisational changes and political battles, but despite these external uncertainties, it has not been able to jeopardise the integrity of the research and the interpretability of the results.

Over the past two decades, the programme has provided us with a wealth of methodological experience, the most important lessons of which are precisely the lessons that challenge the framework. With few exceptions, the main characteristic of large sample surveys of youth – the large sample – is typically not exploited by researchers. The four-year data collection interval is too infrequent, and the measurement instrument and the associated preparatory and processing work too long. Among the questionnaire surveys, the methodology of the large sample survey of youth is both old-fashioned with its personal, address-list approach and highly innovative with the use of 2,000 subsamples built into a core sample of 8,000 and the use of tablet-based interviewing.

The need to follow trends and to gain a comprehensive knowledge of youth calls for the continuation of the research, but the renewal of the previous framework cannot be avoided. The ever longer questionnaire and the associated shorter attention to respondents make it impossible to maintain high data quality. It is therefore necessary to renew a research programme that has been in place for two decades. What needs to be retained from the old in the new chapter of youth research is the professional prestige of the research and the possibility of trend analysis.

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[18] The empirical support for the theory of the youth transition is provided by the large sample of youth survey data from the year 2000, while the narrative of youth and the paradigm of the new silent generation is based primarily on the results of the 2012 survey

[19] The main criticism is that research databases are not made available immediately/quickly. Consistent and transparent practice is to make databases freely available free of charge at the same time as the publication of the volume of studies, the reason for which is to ensure that the professionals who have carried out the research are the first to publish it, which is difficult to question. To use an analogy, we do not dispute the right of the archaeologist to be the first to enter the tomb he finds, nor the astronomer to name the star he discovers, etc.

A possible new concept for youth research should, on the basis of the experience gained so far, have as its main objective more frequent data collection and dissemination of results. A possible solution:

- every two years, with a basic sample of 2,000 respondents, which includes separate main themes alongside trends (e.g. starting a family and having children one year, culture and digital culture two years later).
- every two years (always in the year after the 2000 survey), a smaller sample of respondents is surveyed on a narrower set of issues or target groups, using a different methodology.
- every four years, a survey is carried out abroad, with a baseline sample of 500 and 1000 respondents, including the Western Diaspora.

One of the most popular areas in contemporary social science is the study of the new generation, and there is a lot of professional work going on in several workshops in Hungary. I am convinced that there is a justification for continuing this series of research, and that by retaining the virtues and incorporating innovations, research on youth can be given a new impetus.

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07

Orsolya Béki[1]

The Relationship Between Teenage Parenthood and Extreme Poverty in Hungary Today

Introduction

In parallel with the generally characteristic increase in the timing of childbearing, the number of teenage pregnancies has markedly decreased in developed countries, including Hungary (Arei, 2009; Szabó - Makay, 2021). Nevertheless, in the political discourse, and in the scientific literature, teenage childbearing is identified as a problematic phenomenon with a number of health, psychological and - importantly for the present study - social risks (Arei, 2009; Szikra, 2010).

While in the 1960s and 1970s, youth childbearing affected a much larger group of people internationally, the phenomenon became a social problem later on.

This is because, on the one hand, childbearing generally occurred earlier in women's lives, so it was not unusual for someone to become a mother before the age of 20. According to Lisa Arei, in this era, the age of the mother was less of a public concern, and the focus was more on the appropriate marital status, i.e. whether or not the child was born in wedlock (Arei, 2009).

On the other hand, over the past decades, early childbearing in developed countries has increasingly become a phenomenon affecting a marginalised group of people with lower social status and fewer children than in previous eras (Imamura et al, 2007; Wellings et al, 2016). Researchers argue that this is a problem because most women who have children at a young age are unable to complete their interrupted schooling and thus find it difficult to integrate into the labour market, so that early family formation is, in essence, a way of perpetuating disadvantageous social status and perpetuating inequalities (Imamura et al, 2007; Wellings et al, 2016).

These trends can also be observed in relation to teenage childbearing based on Hungarian statistical analyses (Makay, 2019; Szabó – Makay, 2021; Szikra, 2010).

In Hungary, Roma youth are overrepresented among teenage mothers, and in this paper, I argue primarily that this is due to the social exclusion and extreme poverty affecting a significant proportion of Roma.

In the following analysis, after outlining the most important conceptual frameworks related to the topic, I will present – after a brief international perspective – how trends in teenage childbearing in Hungary have changed from the fall of the system to the present day.

Then, I will try to clarify the background of why the proportion of Roma women among teenage mothers may be higher by presenting the social situation and reproductive behaviour of Roma women in Hungary.

Finally, I will review research findings that have specifically sought to explain why under-age childbearing may be prevalent in some deprived Roma communities.

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Basic concepts and contexts

As a first step of the theoretical analysis, I will review the most important research methodological and sociological concepts related to the topic of the study.

I define teenage or underage mothers as women who give birth at the age of 19 or younger, according to the definition used by the Central Statistical Office (KSH, 2021). Currently, according to KSH data, 5.4% of all live births in Hungary are attributed to the teenage age group (KSH, 2021). Adolescent pregnancies are strongly associated with a social group with low status and an unfavourable social position (Szabó – Makay, 2021). For this reason, I consider it important to clarify the scientific interpretation of the concept of social exclusion, which is often used in my work.

My definition of poverty and exclusion is based on the ideas of Amartya Sen (Sen, 2003; 2004). Poverty in this conceptual framework does not simply mean low income, but a more complex deprivation. Sen sees poverty as a deprivation of opportunity. Drawing on Aristotle's understanding, he focuses on the freedom of a person's life chances, i.e. whether the individual has the opportunity (freedom) to participate in activities that benefit him or her (Sen, 2003).

Zsuzsa Ferge sees the usefulness of Sen's concept of exclusion as pointing to a complex problem that goes beyond material poverty and includes the deprivation of various rights, resources, actions and opportunities (Ferge, 2000).

In Hungary, the structural changes brought about by the regime change have led to the emergence of a socially, and in many cases spatially distinct group of people who experience aspects of social exclusion in their everyday lives (Szalai, 2002). Social groups experiencing exclusion are permanently excluded from the labour market, their children do not have access to an adequate level of education, their housing conditions are unsatisfactory, and in many cases, they are not only socially but also spatially distant from members of the majority society and are also affected by various forms of residential segregation that reinforce these processes (Ferge, 2005; Ladányi – Szelényi, 2004; Szalai, 2002; Virág, 2010). It is widely documented in the national literature that the Roma population is not only over-represented among the poorest, multi-disadvantaged groups, but that their share is increasing (Bass, 2007; Ladányi – Szelényi, 2004; Szalai, 2002; Virág, 2010).

If we are talking about social exclusion, in the context of the present study, the question of ethnicity cannot be avoided in the domestic context, in the aspect of how to define the ethnic classification of Roma, or more simply: who can actually be considered Roma.[2] The question is complex and the answer is not exact. There are many difficulties in determining the exact number of Roma in Hungary and thus their exact proportion, including among those living in exclusion or having children as teenagers.

[2] I use the terms „Roma" and „Gypsy" as synonyms in my thesis, apart from the academic debate on the use of the two terms, following the position of Csaba Dupcsik. In his work „A magyarországi cigányság története" (The History of Gypsies in Hungary", he argues that he intends to indicate the simultaneous use of the words „Roma" and „Gypsy", considering neither term more important or self-evident than the other (Dupcsik, 2009).

According to Friedrich Barth's concept of ethnicity, the construction of ethnicity is achieved through various social transactions (Barth, 1996), which can be of two kinds: internal definition and external definition (Jenkins, 2002). Internal definition is when social groups define themselves and their boundaries; in this case, ethnicity can be understood as a group. In the case of external definition, membership of a given ethnic group is not defined by the group members but by external persons; in this case, we can speak of the ethnic group as a category (Jenkins, 2002).

For the Roma in Hungary, the definition of ethnicity is complex.

Some research rejects the reliance on the self-report method, since a significant proportion of Roma, according to statistical data based on self-report (e.g. censuses), conceal their ethnicity for fear of discrimination (Ladányi – Szelényi, 2004). According to István Kemény and his colleagues, many studies consider those persons as Roma who are perceived as such by the non-Roma environment (Havas – Kemény – Kertesi, 1998). Contradicting the former claim, János Ladányi and Iván Szelényi argue for a ‚multi-stage' classification, taking into account self-reporting, the opinion of the research interviewers on the ethnicity of the respondent, and the opinion of the mostly non-Roma expert environment (e.g. social institutions, local government employees), i.e. the classification of the non-Roma environment (Ladányi - Szelényi, 2004).

Júlia Szalai points out that the dimensions of ethnicity and social issues are often confused, and that since the change of regime, the Roma issue has been the most common one in governmental policies, which has been interpreted as a kind of poverty issue (Szalai, 2000). This influences the definition of Roma ethnicity by the external environment, i.e. in practice, the majority society often conflates the concept of poverty with that of Roma, and the issue of poverty is often ethnicised (Ladányi – Szelényi, 2004).

Teenage mothers in Europe and Hungary

In line with fertility behaviour in developed countries, the average age of women at first childbirth has been extended in recent decades, resulting in a significantly smaller group of women having children at an early age in Hungary. This trend is also observed in other European countries.

However, despite the decreasing trend, the international literature identifies teenage childbearing as a social problem, as it is increasingly associated with a group of disadvantaged social status (Imamura et al, 2007; Wellings et al, 2016). Persistent poverty and social groups affected by geographical and ethnic disadvantage are over-represented among teenage mothers in most European countries (Imamura et al, 2007).

Therefore, targeted policy measures have been taken in several Western countries to reduce the prevalence of early childbearing, including the UK, which has a history of relatively high adolescent fertility rates (Arei, 2009; Imamura et al, 2007; Wellings et al, 2016).

The UK is a particularly interesting example of teenage fertility. In the early 2000s, the government developed a comprehensive action plan, the Teenage Pregnancy Strategy, with the aim of reducing the number of teenage pregnancies, which were traditionally high in the country

by European standards and were typically associated with a deprived social group (Imamura et al, 2007; Wellings et al, 2016). An important objective of the programme was to reduce teenage fertility, and efforts were made to improve the availability of adequate contraceptive methods and to increase the focus on implementing a comprehensive sexuality education programme (Wellings et al, 2016). Another important objective was to improve the educational and labour market situation of teenage mothers. The strategy has led to a significant reduction in teenage pregnancy rates and an increase in the participation of under-18s in education (Wellings et. al, 2016). However, in addition to the important results achieved by the programme, other studies note that the government has overemphasised the problem of teenage childbearing, placed less emphasis on measures to improve the well-being of young mothers and their children, and failed to sufficiently reduce the relatively high inequalities that cause high fertility rates (Arei, 2009).

If we look at the relevant statistical data from the last few decades in Hungary, we find similar results to European trends in the development of young childbearing.

Table 1: Number of live births per thousand underage women in Hungary

1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2015	2016	2017	2018
50.5	68.0	39.5	23.3	17.9	22.8	24.8	22.9	22.0

Source: *Szabó - Makay, 2021*

In the decades before the change of regime, the incidence of young people starting families was relatively high, but after the 1990s there was a marked decline.

The very high levels of youth fertility in the 1970s and 1980s warranted a scientific exploration of the population affected by early childbearing from a health and social science perspective.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a nationally representative and longitudinal study was carried out to investigate the situation of Hungarian women who had children before they reached the age of majority, the circumstances and reasons for becoming mothers (Pongrácz – S. Molnár, 1994).[3]

The analysis, published in 1994, showed that, from a social point of view, teenage childbearing is a problem because it can have a major impact on the future life course of young mothers, whose future prospects are much less favourable than those of their childless peers.

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[3] The significance of the research is indicated by the fact that no nationally representative longitudinal study has been conducted since then, which would focus specifically on the social and demographic background of the group of women giving birth in their teens.

They are forced to interrupt their schooling because of child-rearing responsibilities, which many of them are unable to make up for years later (Pongrácz – S. Molnár, 1994).

Their reintegration is hampered by the fact that they are four times more likely to have large families than women of the same age but who have their first child later, which in many cases results in longer periods of inactivity on the labour market (Pongrácz – S. Molnár, 1994). In their case, this was a problem because the exclusion from the labour market clearly preserved the already poor social situation and persistent poverty that a significant proportion of them already had (Pongrácz – S. Molnár, 1994).

Health concerns about early childbearing have also been raised in the research findings, as biologically immature underage mothers are more likely to experience complications during pregnancy and are more likely to have premature births (Pongrácz – S. Molnár, 1994). However, the analysis also pointed out that the occurrence of health disorders may be associated with social factors in addition to the fact of early childbearing.

The authors assumed a frequent pattern of teenage pregnancies, since a significant proportion of the respondents themselves came from families where the mother gave birth to her first child relatively early (Pongrácz – S. Molnár, 1994).

Less than half of the teenage mothers surveyed had consciously planned to have children, so it can be assumed that they lacked information about the possibilities of avoiding unwanted pregnancies.

The respondents were classified into four categories by Tiborné Pongrácz and Edit S. Molnár, based on their childbearing circumstances and social situation. Although teenage mothers were over-represented among those of lower status, overall they were a heterogeneous social group in many respects. One of the four categories was made up of young people with a particularly marginalised social status, living in persistent poverty, mainly Roma. From the 2000s onwards, significantly fewer women were affected by early childbearing among teenagers at the national level than in the study period of the analysis presented above.

There are several important factors behind the downward trend shown in Table 1. Firstly, fertility levels in all age groups declined after the 1970s and 1980s, and this decline affected young people the most (Szabó – Makay, 2021).

The significant decline in the teenage population is thought to be due to the effect of educational expansion, i.e. the lengthening of the average time spent in further education (Husz, 2006).

In the decades following the regime change, the promotion and availability of contraception and more open discourse on sex education may have played a role in reducing pregnancies (Szikra, 2010).

The data in Table 1 also show a slight increase in the number of people affected after 2010. Since 2011, fertility rates in Hungary have been generally increasing, i.e. the number of children per woman of childbearing age has increased (Makay, 2019). This increase in fertility has affected different age groups differently, with a relatively large increase in the 15-19 age group, where the increase was 25% (Kapitány – Spéder, 2018). If we look for an answer to the increase in the

number of teenage mothers after 2010, we can consider the impact of the family policy system that has influenced the national fertility data in a positive direction. However, the family policy measures expanded by the government in recent years have had very little impact on young people with low labour market participation and disadvantages, preferring those with secure labour market status (Szikra, 2018). However, another factor, the reduction of compulsory schooling from 18 to 16 in 2011, may have contributed to the preference for having children in this age group, as there is evidence that the age of compulsory schooling has an impact on the childbearing behaviour of disadvantaged young people (Adamecz-Völgyi - Scharle, 2018). Overall, the number of teenage pregnancies has fallen significantly in recent decades, but the Hungarian figures are still above average by international standards. When comparing OECD countries, only Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria have higher figures than Hungary (Szabó – Makay, 2021).

To identify the group of people affected by teenage childbearing in contemporary Hungary, we can rely on the statistical analysis of Laura Szabó and Zsuzsanna Makay, who analyse data on teenage pregnancies from a longitudinal national survey of pregnant women currently being conducted by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (Szabó – Makay, 2021). Their study confirms that a significant proportion of pregnancies under 20 years of age are still associated with increased disadvantage compared to the findings of the survey in the 1990s. They point to the importance of residential segregation, with more than half of those affected living in counties with less favourable conditions and more than three-quarters living in municipalities with less than 20 inhabitants (Szabó - Makay, 2021). Based on self-reporting, 28% are considered Roma and 55.5% non-Roma (16% did not declare this). Based on the data, the authors confirm that having children at a young age is not an ethnic issue, explaining the over-representation of Roma by their unfavourable social situation (Szabó – Makay, 2021).

However, the group of pregnant women under 20 years of age is more heterogeneous in terms of their relationship status, for example, the presence of single mothers is more significant in the group, and there are fewer marriages than in previous decades, which the authors explain by the general change in relationship relations between couples (Szabó - Makay, 2021).

According to the literature, a correlation between early childbearing and marginalised social status can therefore be observed in Hungary as well. Compared to the heterogeneity within the group observed in the period before the regime change, a homogenisation of the group of affected persons can be assumed today (Makay, 2019; Szabó – Makay, 2021). Today, in Hungary, a significant proportion (but not all) of teenage pregnancies are associated with a group of people with multiple disadvantages, persistent poverty, residential segregation and social exclusion, among whom Roma are overrepresented (Durst, 2006; Gyukits, 2003; Makay, 2019; Szabó - Makay, 2021).

The situation of Roma women and their attitudes towards having children

Teenage motherhood, as we have seen above, is not a social phenomenon that affects Roma women only. There is no precise data available to determine the percentage of women who have children at a young age who are Roma.[4] However, the studies on teenage childbearing presented earlier show that Roma are over-represented among those affected. To understand this phenomenon, I will briefly review the social situation and attitudes of Roma women in Hungary towards childbearing.

Several studies and empirical researches have shown in the past decades that the proportion of Roma is significantly high among families in deep poverty, and in a situation of cumulative deprivation (see, among others, Babusik, 2007; Ladányi – Szelényi, 2004; Husz – Vastagh, 2016). The studies discuss the structural factors that cause the overrepresentation of the Roma population among those living in deep poverty. The main reason is the high incidence of long-term exclusion from the labour market, which is due to a combination of social factors. On the one hand, the extremely low educational attainment of the Roma population and the high drop-out rate, as well as their poor health and the discrimination they often face, are decisive (Babusik, 2007).

The spatial segregation of Roma is a major disadvantage in terms of employment opportunities, with a significant proportion of the Roma population living in areas with poor economic conditions, in small settlements or urban segregations (Virág, 2010).

The situation of Roma women is characterised by complex disadvantages. Their labour market activity is even less favourable than that of Roma men, as they are often affected not only by long-term unemployment but also by inactivity in employment for other reasons (Babusik, 2007). Compared to the majority society, early childbearing and a higher number of children compared to the majority society, the provision of family life makes it even more difficult for Roma women to participate in education and to obtain and keep a full-time job (Bernát - Páthy, 2009). As with non-Roma youth, girl children perform better in school among Roma, but do not have a higher average qualification level than boys (Babusik, 2007).

Statistics show that on average Roma women become mothers at a younger age and have more children than their non-Roma peers (Janky, 2007).

Since the 1980s, there has been a slow decline in the statistical data on the number of young births among Roma, so they are still starting families at a younger age than their non-Roma peers, but the timing of childbearing is also delayed (Janky, 2007).

It may be assumed that the current high but declining propensity to have children among Gypsies is a delayed consequence of the prevailing trend in the majority of society. In testing this hypothesis, Béla Janky concludes that the assumption of a modernisation lag oversimplifies what is in fact a very complex problem because Roma women tend to start and finish

[4] This is partly due to the complexity of defining Roma ethnicity, which I have explained in the discussion of the basic concepts of the study.

childbearing a few years earlier than the majority society did in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s (Janky, 2005).

Béla Janky mentions the possible co-existence of several influencing factors on teenage childbearing. A key factor is the lower level of education among Roma, which is one of the most important social and demographic indicators for women giving birth at a young age (Janky, 2005; Husz, 2011).

Similarly to the level of qualification, residential segregation, which contributes to the perpetuation of disadvantage, is typically common among adolescent mothers in general (and also among the Roma population in Hungary), which may be a determinant of early childbearing because spatial segregation also tends to result in a poorer network of relationships (Virág, 2010), and thus may make the patterns of habits and fertility of a given micro-community more significant.

Differences in fertility behaviour between Gypsy groups can be inferred from the average age at birth of the first child of Oláh, Beás and Hungarian Gypsy (Romungro) mothers, which shows smaller differences. A very small, but still significant, shift towards the fertility patterns of the majority society can be observed among Beás Gypsies in recent years (Janky, 2005; Husz, 2011).

The prevalence of adolescent childbearing has also declined among Roma overall, but several qualitative sociological studies have shown that teenage motherhood became more common in the 1990s and 2000s in some small Roma communities in segregated deep poverty (Gyukits, 2003; Durst, 2006). However, the observed cases are only true at the level of some micro-communities, in other Roma communities the alignment with the fertility behaviour of the non-Roma majority has been observed (see, among others, Durst, 2001b; Husz, 2011).

Based on the childbearing trends of the Roma, an ethnic difference in fertility behaviour patterns can be hypothesised. Judit Durst, however, has demonstrated the partial validity of the so-called „social characteristics" hypothesis, well known in the international literature and successfully applied to other ethnic minorities, for differences in fertility between Roma and non-Roma. The main hypothesis of the theory is that the different social composition of minority ethnic groups and the lower than average social status of their members is the reason for different childbearing patterns from the majority, i.e. reproductive behaviour is not solely influenced by race but rather by status and social situation (Durst, 2006).

Using statistical analysis of a large sample of representative data comparing the number of children per family of poor Roma and non-Roma women, the author concludes that ethnicity alone does not determine how many children an individual raises, but only in combination with education, which is more important than any other determinant. The results of his study show that the average number of children born to women with at least primary education is about the same, regardless of whether they are Roma. However, among women who have not completed primary school, Roma have twice as many children as their non-Roma counterparts with the same level of education, meaning that the ethnic effect is more significant among the least educated.

Possible causes of teenage childbearing among Roma living in extreme poverty

Over the past decades, several possible explanations have emerged in domestic social science research to explain the different fertility attitudes of Roma. In the following, I will present the three most prominent approaches that have emerged in qualitative studies on the childbearing behaviour of Roma in Hungary since the regime change. The first interpretative framework explains the different fertility behaviour by the cultural diversity of the Roma population, the second one attributes the same to essentially economic reasons in the case of people living in extreme poverty. The third approach, focusing on social differences, interprets the fertility behaviour of Roma young people living in extreme poverty as a consequence of exclusion, in contrast to the fertility indicators of the majority society. First, I examine the relevance of the different cultural characteristics of Roma in relation to the timing of childbearing in the light of relevant research.

To explain the different fertility patterns of the Roma population compared to the majority, a thesis has emerged in the public discourse over the past decades, which is perhaps still present today, that early family formation and high fertility rates among Roma are traditional behaviours that can be attributed to cultural factors.

In explaining the different fertility patterns of the Roma population from the majority, a thesis that has emerged in the public discourse over the past decades and is still present today is that early family formation and high fertility rates among Roma are traditional behaviours that can be attributed to cultural factors. This is not generalisable to the Roma population as a whole, but statistical data do show some differences in fertility between different Roma cultural groups.

The Roma community in Hungary cannot be considered a homogeneous group, neither socially nor culturally. Some heterogeneity is also evident in terms of fertility behaviour. There is a slight difference in the average age at birth of first children between Oláh, Beás and Hungarian Gypsy (Romungro) mothers, with Ola and Beás Gypsy women giving birth slightly earlier on average than Romungro women (Janky, 2005). This difference can be seen in the statistical data in the period before and after the regime change, but there is a very small but still visible shift in the figures for the Beás Gypsies towards the fertility patterns of the majority society in recent years (Janky, 2005; Husz, 2011). This statistic is confirmed by Béla Janky in the cultural anthropological study of Gábor Fleck and Tünde Virág, in which they describe changes in the behaviour of a Beás community in southern Baranya, and show, among other things, that in recent years there has been an increasing tendency in the micro-community under study to adapt childbearing behaviour to the habits of the majority society (Fleck – Virág, 1999). Following the above-mentioned analysis, Ildikó Husz also finds similar differences between Roma communities in Baranya (mostly Beás) and Borsod in terms of their childbearing statistics (Husz, 2011).

Basically, the qualitative, in-depth interview research of Mária Neményi entitled „Cigány anyák az egészségügyben" (Gypsy mothers in health care) was based on and explored the cultural differences between Roma groups. In her experience, the childbearing habits of the Roma women interviewed were most influenced by the isolation of their place of residence

and their adherence to traditional forms of behaviour in the Roma community in which the mother lives. The Beás and Oláh Roma respondents in the study gave birth to their first child slightly earlier than the Romany Roma, who differed little in their fertility attitudes from the non-Roma population of the same status (Neményi, 1998, 1999). This was cumulatively true for the Gypsy mothers living in Budapest who participated in the above-mentioned research (regardless of the cultural group to which they belonged), who were less and less attached to the habits of older generations due to more favourable educational and labour market opportunities. According to Neményi, young Roma women have to decide on the timing of having their first child on the basis of a double standard: either they conform to the expectations of their own community and traditions and start childbearing in their teens, or they try to fit in with the fertility patterns of the majority society (Neményi, 1998, 1999).

In addition to the above findings, it is worth adding that the Romungro mothers interviewed were all urban (their circumstances are probably more similar to the „mixed" sample in Budapest), while the Beás and Oláhs come from small villages and segregated environments, so it can be assumed that the degree of residential isolation is a significant factor influencing early childbearing in their case, not only cultural affiliation[5].

There is a debate in both ethnography and sociology as to whether Gypsy culture should be understood as an ethnic culture or rather as a stratified culture, more specifically as a culture of poverty (Szuhay, 1999). My hypothesis is that at the level of some Roma micro-communities, which of these two approaches is correct may differ, since the Roma are a culturally heterogeneous ethnic group, and the Bey, Ola and Hungarian Roma have different customs, which may be reflected in different areas of life, including the timing of childbearing. In addition, I think it is important to note that for the majority of Roma communities in Hungary, the culture of poverty approach seems to be more applicable[6].

The second large body of research on the causes of adolescent childbearing explains the phenomenon primarily in economic terms.

The different fertility behaviour of poor families is mainly attributed to financial factors in an article by Márta Gyenei (Gyenei, 1998), who argues that some children in families with persistently poor financial circumstances are born for strategic reasons, in order to help support the rest of the family through the associated state subsidies (Gyenei, 1998).[7]

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5 In his work, the author points out that the Roma groups interviewed show differences in their living environment. Of the communities interviewed, the most unfavourable housing conditions are associated with the Beás Roma, followed by the Oláhgypsy.

6 In several studies, János Ladányi and Iván Szelényi mention that the situation of Gypsies in Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary is in many respects the same, but also differs. They see the social situation of Bulgarian Roma as more caste-like, while a significant proportion of Roma in Hungary are characterised by an ‚underclass' living situation (Ladányi-Szelényi, 2004). Gypsies in Hungary who are moving towards the middle class mostly choose the path of assimilation, move away from the Roma settlements and follow the behaviour patterns of the majority society, so that later on their environment often does not consider them as Gypsies, but only as poor families with poor conditions (Ladányi-Selényi, 2004).

7 Márta Gyenei applied her theory to both Roma and non-Roma families living in extreme poverty.

According to the author, this theory works as long as the amount of money spent on the child is less than the amount of support received. This is where the theory appears to break down, as the real value of universal state subsidies for children, which are also available to poorer social groups, has been steadily declining since the 1990s (Gábos, 2000; Szikra, 2018). Moreover, it should be noted that the 2011 research by Vera Messing and Emilia Molnár on the livelihood strategies of poor Roma and non-Roma households clearly shows that it is very rare for a household to rely solely on state subsidies, even among those living in poverty. The monthly amounts of money that can be obtained in this way do not cover the family budget, and the vast majority of households can only survive by supplementing their benefits (e.g. through casual work, trading in second-hand goods, ironmongery) (Messing – Molnár, 2011).

Gyenei did not extend his findings to the explanation of the birth of the first child, but the theoretical background of this reasoning is also used in the international literature to explain teenage childbearing (Kelly, 1998).

In contrast to the former argument, the importance of social factors is emphasised by the so-called ‚situational' approach, which interprets the different fertility behaviour of disadvantaged minorities as a consequence of social inequalities. According to this view, unequal distribution of resources causes the marginalisation of marginalised social groups (Kelly, 1998).

The situational approach has emerged in the international literature as an explanation for the different fertility behaviour of African-American minorities in the United States and has been adopted by several studies in Hungary to interpret the childbearing behaviour of the Roma minority in Hungary, which exhibits similar fertility patterns.

According to P. F. Kelly's research, early childbearing in deep-poverty communities is a response to social exclusion, i.e. residential segregation, long-term unemployment, homogenous relationships and the resulting norms that are different from those of the majority society.

The essence of Kelly's findings lies in two closely interlinked strands of thought.

Young people living in ghettos have a lack of multiplexity in their relationships, meaning that the vast majority of those they associate with are from a socially disadvantaged position similar to their own. A ‚truncated network' of relationships in this sense leads to low social capital and hence limited access to the resources needed to improve social status (Kelly, 1998). Since the network of relationships of segregated young people is unlikely to include someone with a high level of education and a secure job, they see the culmination of their lives, the path to adulthood, as motherhood and childbearing, rather than a career (Kelly, 1998).

After the fall of communism, a significant proportion of Gypsies in Hungary were marginalised due to long-term unemployment. The living conditions and norms of many segregated Roma micro-communities are similar to those of the ghettoised blacks in the US described above.

This is supported by research conducted by Judit Durst among the inhabitants of a segregated Roma community in Northern Hungary in a settlement she calls Lápos (Durst, 2001a; 2006).

The interviewees are members of a marginalised community in a cumulatively disadvantaged sub-region, where low educational attainment and unemployment are common, as are teenage childbearing and large families.

In Lápos, the number of children per family and the incidence of teenage motherhood have increased since the 1980s. Overall, young girls are having their first child 2-3 years earlier than older generations. Judit Durst attributes this phenomenon to the changing circumstances after the regime change, increasing residential and school segregation and persistent exclusion from the labour market.

Adolescent childbearing is an almost natural and mostly conscious decision in the lives of women in the Lápos (Durst, 2006). Young girls' chances of further education and employment are very low, and the traditional role of the family mother is still accepted in the community.

According to Durst, in closed, deprived micro-communities like the Lápos, young girls perceive motherhood as the only possible route to adulthood and social esteem.

Since most of their contemporaries decide to have children at a very young age, it is the girls who give birth later on who feel they are missing out.

In order to explain the high number of children per family, the author suggests, based on her experiences in the Lápos, that the children born are the source of happiness and the meaning of life for women living in miserable conditions (Durst, 2001a).

György Gyukits (2003) arrives at similar conclusions in his study of a well-known slum in Budapest. The segregated area in this research is predominantly Roma, but is a culturally heterogeneous community (it is also inhabited by Oláh, Hungarian and Beás Gypsies).

Following Kelly, Gyukits (2003) also explains the deviation of the childbearing habits of the Roma population living in ghettos from social norms by their confinement, involuntary separation from the majority society and the hopelessness of its reversibility.

Gyukits also draws attention to the abstinence behaviour of his interviewees. Some of the interviewees did not have sufficient information on this issue at the beginning of their sexual life and therefore did not use protection and became pregnant. The majority of respondents, however, were consciously seeking to become pregnant and therefore did not use contraception.

Summary

Teenage childbearing is a complex phenomenon from a socio-political point of view, which in some cases can carry health, psychological and social risks. This study focused primarily on the social characteristics of the phenomenon.

While teenage fertility has declined significantly in Hungary in recent decades, the population concerned has become homogenised, with a significant proportion of teenage pregnancies being associated with disadvantaged social status.

Even during the period of regime change, contemporary studies clearly demonstrated that teenage childbearing reinforces the reproduction of inequalities, but the population concerned was still heterogeneous. Today, we can assume that the correlation between exclusion and teenage motherhood has strengthened.

Based on the literature, it is clear that teenage childbearing is not a „Roma issue", and the majority of pregnant women under the age of 20 are not Roma.

It is assumed that there is little difference in fertility behaviour between Roma cultural groups, and that cultural differences in childbearing behaviour may also be significant in some communities. This being said, it can be concluded that the high involvement of Roma in teenage childbearing is significantly related to their unfavourable social situation.

The results of targeted qualitative research indicate that social exclusion (residential, educational, labour market) explains to a large extent the prevalence of teenage childbearing in certain deprived Roma micro-communities living in extreme poverty.

Since the relevant constraints on the timing of family formation in these micro-communities are unrealistic for the majority society, such as the labour market position or the reconciliation of further education and childbearing, the only sure path to adulthood is parenthood, and hence, in their case, adolescent childbearing is a logical response to social exclusion (Kelly, 1998).



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08

Kitti Kiss

Money Is (Not) Equal To Happiness (?):
Examining the Dominance of Factors Determining Well-Being at Work Across Different Career Periods

Introduction

Relevance of the topic

To introduce the topic of my research, I would like to share some personal reflections. Even as a young child, I experienced how important it is to feel good about one's job and to love it. Unfortunately, my parents could not afford to do what made them happy because they did not have the financial means to do it. So even as a child, I had the opportunity to see how much a person's work can affect their sense of global well-being. I vowed then that I would choose a career and that I would work in the future in a place that made me happy, where I felt good about my daily work.

After all, work is one of the most important human activities, which constitutes a significant part of our lives. It is an active and purposeful activity that directly or indirectly affects both the worker and his/her external environment (Bloisi, Cook & Hunsaker, 2007). By directly shaping the conditions for psychological well-being, performance, satisfaction and commitment to the organisation can be positively influenced (Kun & Szabó, 2017), which are also factors that determine the success of organisations. Several studies show that well-being is a key determinant of organisational-level outcomes. For example, promoting employees' subjective well-being has economic benefits, as it reduces absenteeism, turnover and quit rates (Kun, 2010). The costs of employee dissatisfaction or other problems are also closely linked to absenteeism, early retirement and leaving work, which cause productivity losses and affect the performance of organisations (Kun, 2010). Schneider (2003) has investigated how the aggregate attitudes of employees affect organisational performance. The data showed that organisations with higher levels of employee well-being consistently had better market and financial performance. Workers' well-being is indirectly an important issue at the level of society as a whole, as the performance of firms determines the state of the national economy (Szlávicz, 2010).

Objectives

Psychological research is increasingly focusing on employee well-being (Warr, 2007; Cooper and Cartwright, 2009; Siegrist, 1996; 2009). However, there is no consensus among different authors on the concept and dimensions of well-being, and there is no research on the dominance of factors that may show different patterns in terms of career stages. The aim of this research is to demonstrate that the dominant factors of well-being at different stages are different, i.e. not all of them contribute equally to an individual's well-being. In addition, I have focused on the contribution of income to well-being.

In my four-stage research with 489 people, I found that there are clear differences across career periods along certain factors (e.g.: a sense of meaning in work ($H(5)=14.965$, $p=0.011$)). I have given a special focus to the Income dimension in this research. It has been shown that satisfaction with income leads to higher subjective well-being ($r_s(275)=234$, $p<0.001$). But in which career period and what could be the reason for this? These results are presented throughout the article.

My main aim is to create value, firstly by breaking down the stereotypes surrounding young people starting their careers in terms of material wealth, and secondly by proving that it is not a problem, or it is natural even, for material wealth to be a dominant factor in our well-being, as it is the performance of companies that determines the state of the national economy (Szlávicz, 2010).

Theoretical overview

Well-being

Well-being can be understood in relation to many aspects of life (e.g. work, relationships, health). Overall, it is a concept whose different aspects can contribute to the satisfaction and psychological balance of the individual (Deutsch, Fejes, Kun & Medvés, 2015). Therefore, if one area is not satisfactory, it also leaves its mark on the overall sense of well-being.

The classical well-being literature mainly focuses on subjective well-being (SWB), which is a kind of umbrella term, i.e. it includes everything that relates to different aspects of an individual's life (e.g. events experienced, physical and mental events, work). Our subjective well-being is both dispositional and influenced by our material and social situation, as well as by many other environmental conditions that combine to produce an effect (Warr, 2007). Ed Diener (1984) also defines well-being as a subjective evaluation of life. It is subjective because what constitutes a state of well-being for someone depends on the individual. Diener (1984) described four basic components of subjective well-being (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Components of subjective well-being according to Diener (1984)

Life satisfaction — Global rating of life.

Positive affectivity — e.g. happiness, joy, mental health

Negative affectivity — e.g. shame, guilt, stress

Situational satisfaction — e.g. health, work, work-life balance

Source: *own ed.*

Diener (1984) points out that well-being has both cognitive and emotional components since everyone is able to judge and assess the quality of their well-being and to associate different emotions (positive, and negative) with different aspects of it. Thus, the cognitive expression of well-being is generated through a kind of reflective self-evaluation process: e.g. "my living conditions are good", or "my family life is bad". But also affectivity is part of the sense of well-being: "I am happy", "I am sad", etc.

As we can see, subjective well-being is a complex, multi-factorial concept in all respects. Ryff and Keyes (1995) also include self-acceptance, positive relationships with others, autonomy, purpose in life, personal development and the ability to cope with the environment. The concept of well-being as a multidimensional concept is supported by research: statistical results also indicate that optimism, self-control, independence and freedom from anxiety, loneliness and frustration are components of well-being (Sinha & Verma, 1992). However, there is no unanimous consensus among authors on the dimensions and concept of well-being.

Going beyond the classical interpretations of well-being, a new theory of well-being, the PERMA model, emerges as a further elaboration of Martin Seligman's (2011) authentic theory of the joy of life. The essence of this model is that fulfilment and psychological well-being are based on the existence of five factors, which are (Figure 2):

Figure 2: Components of the PERMA model (Seligman, 2011)



Source: *own ed.*

Positive emotions include hedonic feelings of happiness such as pleasure, comfort, warmth and joy. People who have more positive emotions are more reflective, happier and more satisfied with their lives and find meaning in their daily lives (Seligman, 2011).

Engagement is almost a flow experience. It means becoming one with the activity (e.g. playing music, working), losing track of time and surrendering to the action. This is almost the opposite of positive emotions, since in a state of flow most people don't really feel anything. This is because, in this state, focused attention uses up all cognitive and emotional resources (Seligman, 2011).

A positive relationship is when an individual feels socially integrated, supported and cared for, and satisfied with the network of relationships they have already established (Kern, Waters, Adler & White, 2015).

Meaning refers to when a person feels part of something higher, connected to it, and thus that their life is valued (Kern et al., 2015).

Achievement is the work-related dimension of the PERMA model and refers to the perceived accomplishment itself. It is where individuals perceive that they are able to perform their daily tasks adequately and take steps towards achieving their goals (Kern et al., 2015).

The model includes all the factors that together can ensure positive well-being, such as the individual's subjective experience (emotions), his/her activity (to form and maintain relationships, to seek meaning and goals, to achieve) and his/her balanced relationship with the environment (supportive relationships, feedback, professional success and recognition). The importance of the model is also due to the inclusion of the fifth element of the pursuit of achievement and success as a work-related dimension of well-being.

Well-being at work

As we have seen, there are great differences in the definition of well-being between authors, which means that it is not easy for anyone to study a narrow slice of this concept, namely well-being at work. It was not so long ago that researchers began to take a deeper interest in the issue of well-being at work, which was previously understood primarily as a feeling of satisfaction with life, a positive state of mind.

Simply put, well-being at work is the sense of well-being that employees derive from their work (Page, 2005), which includes a basic emotional attitude towards work and satisfaction with external and/or internal job values (Kun, 2010). Overall, it encompasses all work-related factors (e.g. career prospects, supportive management, sense of meaning in work).

Warr (1987) explicitly interpreted well-being in the context of work. The three dimensions of well-being he describes are job autonomy, job demands and peer support at work. These are all related to the three indicators of well-being at work: job satisfaction, job-related anxiety and emotional exhaustion. Warr (2007) also identified twelve aspects of the environment (Figure 3), or "vitamins", that influence well-being at work, and the right proportion and level of these lead to a sense of well-being.

Figure 3: Components of Warr's (2007) vitamin model

Source: *own ed.*

In addition, the model distinguishes between occupational factors that are not toxic in high amounts (like vitamins C and E) and those that are (like vitamins D and A). The former group includes pay, physical security, and social position, while the latter includes job variety, degree of control, amount of skills required, degree of interpersonal relationships, etc. (Landy, 1985).

Siegrist's (1996, 2009) workplace control-reward model (Figure 4) also aims to differentiate the factors of well-being at work.

Figure 4: Components of Siegrist's (1996, 2009) workplace control-reward model

Source: *own ed.*

Reading the theories, we can see that there is an overlap between the factors. For example, in Warr's (2007) and Siegrist's (1996, 2009) models, the factors of Income, Control, Social Relationships, etc. appear. Nevertheless, there is no clear consensus among authors on the concept and the factors. However, all researchers agree on one thing: the presence of well-being at work has a very positive effect on both employees and employers. In the following section, I would like to describe them.

The positive effects of well-being at work

From an employer organisation's perspective, employee well-being and happiness are important for quality, performance and productivity. Numerous studies support and confirm the need to

address the issue of well-being at work (e.g. Cooper & Marshall, 1978; Danna & Griffin, 1999; Warr, 1990), as the experiences and outcomes of work, whether emotional or social, have an obvious impact on employees. In addition, several studies have shown that levels of well-being and happiness are closely related to job stress, absenteeism, sick leave, turnover rates, morale and workplace climate (Van Katwyk, Fox, Spector & Kelloway, 2000; Miles, Borman, Spector & Fox, 2002; Thoresen, Kaplan, Barsky, Warren & de Chermont, 2003). Workers with lower well-being levels are less productive, make lower quality decisions, are more likely to be absent from work and make a consistently declining contribution to organisational performance (Price & Hooijberg, 1992).

At the same time, employee well-being is also related to performance (Donald et al., 2005; Cropanzano & Wright, 1999; Harter, Schmidt & Keyes, 2003), which is perhaps the most important for any organisation. If employees' well-being is positive, they will be more loyal, satisfied and committed to their employer, and the organisation will be characterised by a positive workplace climate (Deutsch et al, 2015). In addition, several studies have shown that happier employees are more creative and productive (Wright & Cropanzano, 2000), earn more, hold higher positions (Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2002), are more helpful to their co-workers (George, 1991), do not burn out and are better able to cope with stress (Iverson, Olekalns & Erwin, 1998).

From the research presented so far, we can see that well-being should be an important consideration in all workplaces, regardless of the profession. In most organisations, it is common practice to focus on problems, shortcomings, or improvement and training. However, focusing specifically on positive factors (e.g. internal psychological resources and well-being), exploring and building on them, and trying to do something specifically for the well-being or happiness of employees is very rare. In the workplace, managers are not very interested in workers' well-being.

However, enhancing wellbeing and happiness is not an end in itself; it has countless long-term positive benefits for both individuals and organisations. Employers need to know and improve employees' attitudes towards work for several reasons. According to Levy (2003), the most important aspect is the humanistic, moral reason. Since most people have to work for a living, they spend a large part of their time working. Employers have a moral obligation to reward individuals for this, or at least to minimise the inconvenience it causes. According to Locke (1976), the purpose of life is happiness, and therefore one of the duties of employers is to contribute to the happiness and job satisfaction of their employees. On the other hand, understanding work-related attitudes can also help to explain the complex aspects of employees' lives outside work. At the same time, employee well-being can also play an important role in recruiting and retaining new employees, as most candidates are more likely to apply and stay in a company where employees feel good. Finally, employee well-being has positive consequences at individual and organisational levels that have a significant impact on the functioning of the company as a whole. For this reason, it can perhaps be argued that adequate well-being is a desirable state of affairs at both the individual and the socio-social level (Kun, 2010).

Problem statement

Well-being factors at different career periods

Reading the various theories, we can see that their authors mention a wide range of factors whose presence or absence influences our sense of well-being at work. However, these theories do not address whether the factors that determine our well-being at work are different for different individuals, or whether this dominance between factors may show different patterns at different periods of our lives.

A young person starting in their career likely has a very different set of factors in mind when choosing a job than, for example, a mother of two or a man approaching retirement. It can therefore be assumed that the same factors will not be the dominant determinants of their sense of well-being at work, as every life and career period has its challenges and difficulties.

This is also pointed out, for example, by Erikson (1963) in his psychosocial theory of development, which focuses on self-identity and its development through the eight periods of the human life course. Self-identity is nothing other than the conscious experience of the self as a result of interaction with social reality. A person's self-identity itself is constantly changing in response to changes in the social environment. Erikson saw the development of self-identity as a series of stages in which a problem to be solved becomes particularly important. He envisaged each phase as a psychosocial crisis or conflict. In this context, a crisis is a turning point or a period of life that offers enormous potential for growth but also makes the person more vulnerable. Crisis is therefore not so much a time pressure as a problem to be solved. The last three of the eight stages are relevant to this paper: young adulthood, adulthood and old age.

Figure 5: The last three stages of Erikson's (1963) psychosocial theory

Source: *own ed.*

Early adulthood lasts roughly from the age of 18 to 20 until the mid-twenties. The conflict in this phase is between the need for intimacy and isolation. Intimacy is an intimate relationship with someone that involves commitment to that person. It requires an openness in our relationships and also requires the moral strength to hold on to our commitment at the cost of sacrifice (Erikson, 1963).

Middle age after adolescence is the longest psychosocial stage, usually lasting until the mid-sixties. The crisis of adulthood is about our ability to create something and/or raise someone. The central conflict can therefore be captured by the opposition pair of creativeness (generativity)

versus stagnation (Erikson, 1963). Creativeness means creating something that will outlive us (Kotre, 1984). One such possibility is childbearing, since, if we give life (we create), we will symbolically exist in the future. However, the concept is broader than this, encompassing the creation of ideas or physical objects, or the education of children other than our own – in short, anything that positively influences the future. The aspects of creativity are shown in Figure 6:

Figure 6: Aspects of creativity according to Kotre (1984)



Source: *own ed.*

Erikson (1963) believed that the desire to be creative implies a shift away from intimacy towards society as a whole. Once a sense of creativity is established, it can be maintained throughout life (Zucker, Ostrove & Stewart, 2002).

The final stage is the age of maturity, old age. It is the final chapter of a person's life. It is a time of retrospection, a time of reckoning, when we take stock of our decisions, our successes, our failures, and the turns our lives have taken. The crisis is a tension between self-integrity and despair. When the balance shows that our lives have been basically meaningful, our choices and actions have been mostly right, we reach a state of self-integrity. We feel a sense of satisfaction that we have accomplished what we set out to do, and we can say that we would not live our lives in a fundamentally different way even if we were born again (Erikson, 1963). Other authors also talk about life reflection (Gould, 1980; Levinson, 1978; Stewart & Vandewater, 1999; Vaillant, 1977), but they place it in an earlier period, around the forties, and therefore popularly refer to this phenomenon as the 'mid-life crisis'. It is that around the age of 40, many people question almost everything they have done in their adult lives: the meaning of their earlier decisions and

choices, their whole life situation – almost everything they have achieved so far. It is a time of reassessment, but also a chance to change things before it is too late. We can make new choices, reorder our priorities, change jobs, repair our marriages or even leave them.

If we take Erikson's theory as a starting point, we will face different tasks and situations at different times in our lives, and it follows that different dominant factors will be the most important for us in our work. This is evidenced by the dynamic equilibrium theory of Headey and Wearing (1989), which they introduced as a dynamic equilibrium model and which was developed in the analysis of the long-term evolution of happiness and life satisfaction. The researchers, using Australian household panel data, found that each person has an average level of subjective well-being that is specific to them. This value moves within a certain range over the course of an individual's life, deviating only when major life events (e.g. birth of a child, divorce, loss of a spouse, unemployment) occur.

The impact of income on well-being

However, there was one other very important idea that occurred to me, and that was about income. If we take the workplace well-being theories presented at the beginning of this study, they all list income as a significant factor influencing our sense of well-being. E.g. Warr's (2007) vitamin model, the ASSET model (Cooper & Cartwright, 2009) or Siegrist's (1996, 2009) job control-reward model. Nevertheless, our society today almost expects us, when we talk about our happiness at work, not to mention money, because money does not make us happy - as the Hungarian proverb goes. Yet, theories include salary as an influencing factor; but why then do we think differently about people who work for money and that makes them happy? Especially young workers are stereotyped in this way. For example: that salary is the only thing that matters to them when choosing a job.

Even early research showed that higher-income earners were more likely to report being happy than lower-income earners (Easterlin, 1973). Based on a second World Values Survey in the early 1990s, Diener and Biswas-Diener (2002) found that low-income earners were less likely (0.8 times) to be satisfied with their lives than high-income earners. Data from 2004 showed that the proportion of people in the United States with family incomes above $90,000 per year who reported being very happy was almost twice as high as those with incomes below $20,000 per year (Kahneman, Krueger, Schadke, Schwarz & Stone, 2006).

True, income does not increase well-being indefinitely: in the United States, a survey conducted between 1994 and 1996 found that doubling income in the bottom five income deciles increased happiness almost twice as much as in the top five deciles (Frey & Stutzer, 2002). Similarly, a 2004 survey, also in the United States, showed that there was no significant difference in happiness between high-income earners ($50,000-90,000 per family per year) and those earning over $90,000 per family per year (Kahneman et al. 2006). Using data from the World Values Survey, Helliwell's (2003) research demonstrates this, showing that moving from a fourth to a fifth income decile increases life satisfaction (on a scale of 1-10) by 0.10 points, while moving from the ninth to the tenth decile increases it by only 0.01 points.

This is also what Mentzakis and Moro (2009) found when analysing household panel data from 1996-2003. They found that low-income earners are more likely to have higher well-being, while an increase in the material well-being of high-income earners does not increase the likelihood of belonging to the most satisfied category, but actually decreases it. That is, income can only increase subjective well-being to a certain extent. Using German panel data from 1984 to 2004, Boes and Winkelmann (2010) found that, contrary to the standard, for men, an increase in income does not significantly change the probability of being in the most satisfied category, although higher income can reduce dissatisfaction. For women, the effect of income is even less significant.

We can see that there is a moderate positive correlation between income and well-being. This may be because the financial situation allows for the satisfaction of basic needs such as adequate housing, regular meals, and a certain income is presumably also necessary to avoid feeling like an outsider and to be accepted by society as a full member. Gyenes and Rozgonyi (1981) also point out that the 'material' and 'social' needs of workers expected from their work can only be distinguished conditionally. Expectations that appear on the surface as material needs are also often indicative of a social need for social esteem. Accordingly, an increase in income is associated with an increase in subjective well-being through the satisfaction of basic needs.

Research results

My four-stage research with 489 participants was based on a pretest to assess the dominance of dimensions of well-being and on semi-structured interviews. After analysing the qualitative results, I compiled a well-established set of questionnaires for my study in order to get as comprehensive a picture as possible of the pattern of dominance of the factors and the relationship between income and well-being. Finally, in order to interpret the results obtained in the questionnaire package, I have also designed a questionnaire to investigate in more detail the explanatory factors that may underlie the role of income/money at different ages and career periods.

The main objective of my research was to demonstrate that the dominant factors of well-being at different career periods are different, i.e. not all of them contribute equally to an individual's well-being. This objective was partially met, as I found differences between career periods along with the importance of several factors.

Based on the Kruskal-Wallis[1] test:

- physical well-being ($H(5) = 17.303$, $p = 0.004$),
- career prospects ($H(5) = 18.775$; $p = 0.002$),
- sense of meaningfulness of work ($H(5) = 14.965$; $p = 0.011$) and
- good relationships ($H(5) = 11.708$; $p = 0.039$) differ in importance between career periods.

1 The Kruskal-Wallis test is a statistical test used to compare three or more independent groups on a non-normally distributed sample.

The post-test showed that physical well-being, career prospects and good relationships were more important for 18-24 year olds. This may be due to the fact that this is a period of career preparation (Pintér, 2001). If the individual has previously chosen further education, this is the time to acquire the theoretical basis for the profession and to decide on the field of work. In the case of early careers in employment or entrepreneurship, it is here that decisions on further training or a possible career change or change of activity should be taken. It is very important that individuals prepare for work placements, build up contacts and lay the foundations for the period of employment. According to the psychosocial theory of development (Erikson, 1963), this is also the phase of young adulthood, a period of conflict between the need for intimacy and isolation. Intimacy is an intimate relationship with someone that involves commitment to that person. It requires an openness in our relationships and the moral strength to hold on to our commitment at the cost of sacrifice. It is therefore not surprising that these dimensions are so important to them.

A sense of meaning in work was more important for the 35-65 age group. Linked to this period is the mid-life crisis ("What have I put on the table?") (Gould, 1980; Levinson, 1978; Stewart & Vandewater, 1999; Vaillant, 1977), whereby many people, around the age of 40, question almost everything they have done in their adult lives: the meaning of their earlier decisions and choices, their whole life situation – almost everything they have achieved so far. It is a time of reassessment, but also a chance to change things before it is too late. We can make new choices, re-prioritise things, change jobs, repair our marriages or even get out of them. In addition to the mid-life crisis, this is also the time of Erikson's (1963) generativity, when the question "What can I create that will survive me?" is formulated. Valued work and vocation, for example, can be an expression of these. The main developmental challenge during this period is how to contribute to society and help future generations. Erikson (1963) believed that the desire to be creative implies a shift away from intimacy towards society as a whole. Once this feeling is established, it can persist throughout life (Zucker et al., 2002).

For similar reasons, the deepening dimension may be more important for the 46-65 age group. These differences may result not only from age specificities but also from the differential impact of macro- and micro-factors. In a discussion with one of my interviewees, the period when he was looking for a job as a young person starting out in his career was mentioned. This was in 2009, during the economic crisis. According to him, at that time, the factors that were important for young people starting their careers were completely different from those that are important today. The impact of changes in the economic environment on well-being has been demonstrated by several studies (e.g. unemployment rates or increases in inflation, cf. Winkelmann, 1998; Di Tella, Macculoch & Ooswald, 2001; Becchetti, Castriota & Giuntella, 2006).

However, I find differentially dominant factors not only across career periods but also across genders. Based on the Mann-Whitney test[2]:

- positive emotions (U[3] = 6505.5; z[4] = -2.962; p[5] = 0.003; r = -0.180),
- immersion in work (U = 6692.5; z = -2.340; p = 0.019; r = -0.141),
- sense of control over work (U = 6917; z = -2.782; p = 0.005; r = -0.171),
- Variety of work (U = 6860.5; z = -1.950; p = 0.050; r = -0.120),
- the use of skills (U = 1558.5; z = -0.180; p = 0.036; r = -0.021) and
- income/money (U = 1379.5; z = -1.981, p = 0.048; r = -0.171) differ between genders.

The post-test showed that women were more concerned with the use of skills, positive emotions and immersion in work, while men were more concerned with income/money, a sense of control over work and the dimensions of variety in work. This also demonstrates that there is variation between individuals, and it also appears to vary as spectacularly across gender as it does across career periods. Thus, the concept of well-being implies a dynamic and fluid state rather than a constant and stable state (Robertson & Flint -Taylor, 2008).

Income/money did not show a significantly different pattern across career periods, i.e. it was equally important and significant for people in all periods ($H(5) = 3.957$; $p = 0.556$). This is further evidenced by the results showing that satisfaction with financial situation has a weak positive relationship with subjective well-being $r_s(275) = 234$; $p < 0.001$, and that satisfaction with income is also a significant positive predictor of subjective well-being (beta = 0.409; SE = 0.287; standardised beta = 0.285; t = 4.912; $p < 0.001$). Campbell and colleagues (1976) also found in their study that income level has an effect on subjective well-being. Subsequent studies have similarly found a small but significant correlation between financial status and subjective well-being. This is true for both economic (e.g. Oswald, 1997; Blanchflower & Oswald, 2004; Clark, 2003) and psychological (e.g. Argyle, 1987; Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2002) approaches.

Haring and colleagues (1984) found an average correlation of 0.17 between the two variables. The correlation is weak even though the studies included very wealthy individuals.

I have been able to prove that it is not only the young generation that is specific to the importance of income/money for well-being at work. I think that there is nothing wrong with this, since, if we start from theories of well-being at work, they all include it as a factor that has a significant impact on our sense of well-being. E.g. in Warr's (2007) vitamin model, the ASSET model (Cooper & Cartwright, 2009) or Siegrist's (1996, 2009) job control-reward model. On the other hand, as my interviewees and those who filled in the second questionnaire said: 'everyone lives for money', 'everyone works mainly for that one SMS at the end of the month'. They all agreed that money is important. But why is it important to everyone? 95% of respondents said the main reason is that money is a basic necessity in our lives. It buys us bread in the shop, books for our university exams,

[2] The Mann-Whitney test is a statistical test used to compare two independent groups on a non-normally distributed sample.
[3] How many sample pairs have a higher result in one group.
[4] Value of the statistic calculated from the rank sum.
[5] The significance.

clothes for our children, etc. This is what Jahoda (1981) said in her theory of the reasons for working. The first of these is the instrumental/extrinsic reason, i.e. the satisfaction of needs, the provision of a livelihood or income. Bloisi and colleagues (2007) also consider the economic as one of the functions of employment, which refers to the fact that employment provides individuals with a livelihood. In addition, 15% of the responses indicated that income gives feedback on the work done, the value, usefulness and appreciation of the employee. Bloisi et al. (2007) see this as a function of work providing a sense of self-worth, whereby work also provides a sense of identity, making it easier for the worker to define who he or she is and how useful a member of society he or she is. The historical and cultural reason was also mentioned in 13% of the responses, and money as a status symbol in 10% of the responses. The latter is identified by Bloisi et al. (2007) as a social status-enhancing function of work since advancement in rank is not only associated with higher remuneration but also usually with greater social recognition.

So the problem does not start when money is important for well-being at work, but when it is the only factor that matters to an individual's sense of well-being at work. So, if I go by the title of my essay, money does make you happy. And for everyone. And that's natural. However, this one factor alone is not enough for our sense of well-being. After all, well-being is a concept whose various aspects can together contribute to an individual's satisfaction and psychological balance (Deutsch et al., 2015). But these aspects can also show different dominance with respect to gender and career periods. So it is time to say goodbye to stereotypes.

My research can also be a good starting point for employers to retain and motivate their employees, as employers today are still not very aware of their employees' well-being, they usually put much more emphasis on supporting physical or mental health, although by directly shaping the conditions of psychological well-being, personal feelings of self-efficacy, satisfaction and commitment to the organization can be positively influenced (Kun et al., 2015). At the same time, well-being at work is also related to performance (Donald et al., 2005; Cropanzano & Wright, 1999; Harter et al., 2003), which is perhaps the most important for any organisation. Positive well-being of employees will result in improved productivity, improved morale, reduced absenteeism, accidents, turnover and reduced absenteeism due to sickness. At the same time, employees will be more loyal, satisfied and committed to their employer and the organisation will be characterised by a positive workplace climate (Deutsch et al., 2015).

That is why employers need to pay more attention to the well-being of their employees. Workplace well-being can be enhanced if organisations consciously design working conditions (external and internal) in a way that positively influences employees' well-being (Deutsch et al., 2015). According to Page (2005), this can be done by providing opportunities and conditions such as:

- meaningful and impactful work;
- responsibility and independence in tasks;
- a subjective sense of achievement from the work, and
- the provision of tasks that match skills and knowledge.

When thinking about the external conditions, it is worth considering

• realistic working hours,
• favourable working conditions and
• the possibility of development and promotion,
• emphasis on recognition (both financial and non-financial) for a job well done,
• job security, and
• recognition of the person as an individual.

You may want to adapt these to your career periods. For workers aged 18-24, it is worth providing tasks that match their skills and knowledge, as well as opportunities for development and progression. For 25-35 year olds, realistic working hours and favourable working conditions are more important, as this is a time for starting a family. For workers aged 36-65, providing meaningful, and impactful work may be of particular importance, as this is the period of Eriksonian (1963) generativity. The results of my research suggest that for everyone, the recognition of a job well done (material and non-material) is an important condition. If workers are supported in their well-being, there are numerous benefits not only for the individual but also for employers.



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



09

Fanni Maszlag

Generation Y and Z Gypsy girls' search for identity

„Religion is the basis of my identity"

Introduction

Roma are the largest and most vulnerable minority in Europe, currently numbering nearly 12 million people and projected to increase in the coming years.[1] Despite their demographic growth and size, Roma have traditionally faced severe marginalisation.[2] The disadvantaged living conditions and opportunities of Roma youth are rooted in historical ethnic tensions and assimilation policies under communist rule, with a significant proportion of Roma living in former communist bloc countries such as Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and the Czech Republic.

The situation of Roma has been the subject of numerous national and international studies. Their population is estimated according to various estimates, depending on who is considered to be Roma (Ladányi & Szelényi, 2004; Havas et al., 2000; Janky, 2005; Kemény et al., 2004). However, there is a question among researchers whether the Roma are officially considered an ethnic group, and whether their way of life is considered an ethnic culture or a culture of poverty (Okely, 1983; Szuhay, 1999).

In this study, I consider the Roma and the surveyed Generation Y and Z Roma youth in higher education as an ethnic group. I treat Gypsy identity as a free choice and thus consider Gypsy those who identify themselves as such (Bindorffer, 2001; Niedermüller, 1989). The study is based on my doctoral dissertation, where I examined different identity strategies in three generations of Oláh Gypsy women, and on my previous research among Roma students in higher education.

At the beginning of the paper, I briefly discuss the issues of ethnic identity and identity and religion. Then I will present the most important attributes of the target group included in the study, followed by the methodology used in the research. At the end of the analysis, I will elaborate on the religious identity dimension of Generation Y and Z Gypsy girls in higher education as a possible way of integration.

In the course of the analysis, I will seek to identify the most important dimensions of ethnic identity along which Generation Y and Z Gypsy girls in higher education identify themselves. The topic is of particular importance today, as the changing social composition of society is also reflected in the lives of minority groups. The impact of ongoing social and economic changes on identity is crucial in analysing the links between ethnic identity and integration.

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1 https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/roma-eu/roma-equality-inclusion-and-participation-eu_hu

2 https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/roma-eu/roma-equality-inclusion-and-participation-eu_hu

Ethnic identity

An examination and presentation of the complex issue of ethnic identity is beyond the scope of this paper, so I will only provide a brief insight into the conceptual definition.

The concept of ethnic identity is based on how a group defines and characterises itself. According to the philosophy of scientific development, ethnic identity implies the self-recognition and acceptance of the way a person thinks and feels about him/herself (Padilla, 1980). Deshpandé and Stayman (1989) suggested that it is necessary to measure an individual's ethnicity in terms of both ethnic characteristics (ethnic group membership, strength of ethnic identification) and situational ethnicity. In their research, ethnicity was presented not only in terms of "who one is but also in terms of how one feels about a particular situation and a particular situation". Hence, the social context itself helps to determine how an individual feels about the ethnic group (Deshpandé & Stayman, 1989).

In this study, I have developed the concept of ethnic identity based on the theory developed by Fredrik Barth (1969), according to which identity is not static but constantly changing, evolving as a function of interaction with different ethnic groups. It is a 'social self-image' that conveys a set of moral and customary norms both to the outside world and to one's own community. The self-image is constantly shaped by feedback and expectations and influences from within the community. Just as there is no social consensus on identity itself, there is no social consensus on the concept of ethnic identity. Hale (2004) sees it as an ever-changing, dynamic, multidimensional construct with its own particular historical dynamics. It is constantly changing and therefore has the potential to expand and to be filled with new meanings. According to Pataki (1989), ethnic identity cannot be regarded as a static category either, as it is constantly changing along different dimensions, between generations, even in a new culture, with age and over time.

We can see that ethnic identity is a contextual and elusive social-psychological concept. Its external and internal aspects and elements are not retained to the same extent and at the same level across generations. Certain elements are more pronounced, while other elements are less retained or perceived as important by newer generations. Consequently, it cannot be said that the identity held by a given generation is identical to that of previous generations, and the different identity dimensions and strengths of attachment may even differ (Bindorffer, 2001).

Nowadays, most social scientists argue that minority identity is increasingly ethnocentric, assimilated, and organised around a dual identity, but that the problems of identity confusion and integration are also emerging (Pálos, 2010; Neményi, 2006; Tóth, 2008; Binderhoffer, 2001). Whichever strategy or concept is considered, the embrace of Gypsy identity has both advantages and disadvantages (Tóth, 2008).

However, it is important to note that it is difficult to identify with a stigmatised group. Roma face many hardships at different levels and in different areas of life, and there are also situations that amplify the challenges and threats related to identity. According to Goffman (1998), stigma is constructed in social space and "gains its meaning" through various interactions.

In his research on identity threat, Breakwell (1986) emphasized that, in addition to social identity and categorization, structural relations also have a significant impact on coping strategies.[3] According to Breakwell, a sense of identity threat occurs when certain basic principles that govern identity itself do not correspond to an individual's self-identity (Maszlag, 2022). Therefore, in all situations, the individuals concerned will seek to eliminate the sense of threat by choosing the coping strategy that is most ideal for them - one that is compatible with their own self-image.

In this study, I approach ethnic identity as a free choice on the part of the individual, i.e. the extent to which one wishes to identify with a particular ethnic group (Pulay, 2009). Commitment to a group does not automatically imply full participation in the group's daily life and the presentation of group values in the majority society, but if there is a level of commitment and identification, then we can speak of a consistent ethnic identity.

Over the decades, different generations have been subject to different external structural influences, which constantly change the way individuals view their identity. As a result, the two generations under study have different perspectives, mindsets, worldviews and identity strategies from previous generations. The Gypsies will define their identity in relation to the purpose they pursue, and therefore have a different understanding of traditional symbol systems, the concept of morality, the meaning of language use, traditions, culture and religion.

Brief description of the target group

Research conducted by István Kemény and colleagues (2004) in 2003 and census data from 2011 (KSH, 2011) show that an increasing number of Generation Y and Z Roma young people have completed primary school and entered schools offering school-leaving qualifications and vocational training (Janky, 2005; KSH, 2011). Moreover, an increasing proportion of Gypsy girls are enrolled in institutions offering school-leaving qualifications, suggesting that traditional family patterns are beginning to be superseded and that the impact of modernisation is taking hold (Kemény et al, 2004).

The attitudes, mindsets and worldviews of the Generation Y and Generation Z Gypsy girls interviewed in the research have been affected by modernisation and globalisation in a very different way than in the case of the previous generations. The lives, identities and life strategies of young people were influenced by several factors: Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities; the expansion of education in the period; the emergence and expansion of various educational and study grants for Roma; the digital and technological revolution, etc. All these factors have changed the interpretative framework of traditional symbol systems, the significance of traditions and the strength of previously stable ethnic identity dimensions. Compared to previous generations, today's young people enjoy much greater freedom and an almost infinite range of possibilities. At the same time, this excessive freedom comes at a price, as they risk their ethnic identity and their sense of belonging to a community every day as their choices expand.

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[3] The specialist detects the different coping strategies as mechanisms of the effort for social recognition.

Every day they have to redefine the basis of their identity, their boundaries and the meaning of their ethnic community.

Motivation plays an important role in these young Roma girls' aspirations for further education and employment. Generation Y and Z Gypsy girls interviewed had and still have the most positive experiences during their higher education studies. As the young Gypsy girls included in the research were all members – or had been members – of Roma vocational colleges, these institutions provided them with an early opportunity to meet an inclusive community of other young Gypsy girls.

Thus, the young Roma girls of Generation Y and Generation Z who were interviewed and who were studying in higher education had all graduated from/are graduating from university. The educational institutions are located in settlements far from their own gated communities, which contributes to their early separation from their own communities. The sample was chosen deliberately, not only for reasons of accessibility but also because I believe that Gypsy girls who are vocational students consciously take on their minority identity, so that changes in their self-identity, its dimensions and elements, can be more easily studied. Furthermore, their membership in a vocational college may mean that they do not see their ethnicity as a stigma, but see it as an opportunity to expand their self-image and strengthen their identity. In addition, in the different interview situations, they were able to interpret the processes and signs to which I was looking for answers during the research.

I should also stress that the findings in the analysis of the religious dimension of Generation Y and Z may not be valid for all Generation Y and Z Gypsy girls. Therefore, the conclusions are of limited validity and provide only a specific cross-section of the religious dimension of identity.

Methodology

In order to gain a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the research topic, I used several methods. First of all, I started by reviewing the available national and international literature. Previous research on ethnic identity provided the theoretical framework for the subject of my study.

The research used a qualitative interviewing technique – semi-structured – complemented by participant observation. According to Steinar (2005), the qualitative technique is a research method that helps to provide insight into the most minute details of the world through a variety of experiences. Interviews and participant observation not only make visible the changes in identity dimensions as mediated by the interviewees, but also provide a way to gain insight into the interviewees' personal perceptions of changing values. During my fieldwork, I was able to gain experience that provided further important data collection and methodological ammunition for my research. In the non-interview situations, I was able to explore more deeply the reconstructed identity of the interviewees, or certain elements of it, and thus had the opportunity to get to know one of the strongest bases of their Gypsy self-identity. In many cases, the conversations outside the interview situations allowed me to learn about new elements of religious identity that I had not previously known, as they wove their own experiences and

feelings into the conversations. This made it easier for me to understand how their feelings became social actions and how their personal identities were interwoven into a collective ethnic identity.

However, I cannot ignore my position as a researcher. Data collection has an impact not only on the interviewees, and the communities under study, but also on the researcher itself. The presence of the researcher can influence the process of scientific cognition in many ways, and subjective feelings often challenge the requirements of objectivity. However, according to Fleetwood (2009), direct experience enables the researcher to interpret the knowledge gained in the field as complex knowledge embedded in a situation – essential when analysing data. I argue that personhood in fieldwork does not diminish the objectivity of the researcher, but rather deepens it through self-reflection and different shifts in perspective. My personal involvement in the topic was therefore an advantage during the research, as the feedback of previously acquired knowledge only enriches the study. Furthermore, I perceived that many times the deep insights and unstructured conversations I received were tilted along ethnic lines.

In my qualitative research, I was able to conduct 17 semi-structured interviews with Generation Y and Generation Z Gypsy girls in 2017-2018. The interviews were recorded on a dictaphone, and the resulting audio material was also recorded in writing, and it was important to preserve the anonymity of the interviewees.

Empirical research: religion as an identity dimension

As a result of modernisation and globalisation processes, ethnic identity is constantly challenged. The change in its role and significance entails the negotiation of new self-definitions. Members of minorities need to develop a "new, more modern" identity to reflect the realities of their situation without crossing their ethnic boundaries and to remain recognisable to their own community.

The weakening of closed Gypsy communities allows Generation Y and Z girls to internalise other values alongside those of their own group. Increased interactions with mainstream society, peer group influence, technological advances, civic initiatives, and the Christian Roma College Network are all elements that influence the ethnic and national identity of Gypsy girls. Despite all the external "pressures", members of the generations have not continued to assimilate into mainstream society, retaining their ethnic identity, only shifting the emphasis within the dimensions that define self-identity to elements that are less stigmatised by mainstream society.

Religion as a dimension of ethnic identity plays a key role in the research, and it is through religion that ethnic identity can be revived and remain stable.

Theories of secularisation argue that modernisation brings with it a decline in religiosity, but experience does not show this to be the case, as more and more people are turning back to religion and spirituality (Tomka, 1996; Hegedűs, 2000). Andorka (2005) has made similar observations on the issue. According to him, secularisation does not mean the disappearance of religions, but their change. New religious groups have emerged, religious activities have been transformed and new rational elements have been introduced that determine thinking. Religion no longer covers all areas of life as it did in earlier times, it is no longer something that is taken for granted and,

once born into it, determines one's daily life and thinking (Tomka, 2000). According to Berger and Luckmann (1966), religion is increasingly determined by individual choices, it becomes absolutely subjective, i.e. it is completely privatised. The values and worldviews of individuals are not independent of the various environmental conditions and socialisation norms, so society determines attitudes towards religion, the religious values and attitudes of the members of society (Tomka, 2000; Kaufmann, 1996).

Although the change of regime has accelerated the process of secularisation, we are witnessing a process of "re-religion". This does not, of course, mean a complete return to the system of religious traditions, but rather the emergence of a free choice as to the content and nature of religion. People can decide what they accept from the offer of each religion, they can choose from them according to their taste (Földvári & Rosta, 1998).

According to Bindorffer (2001), in the case of the Hungarian Roma, the claim that the majority, by discriminating against them, locks them into their own identity and creates an impenetrable barrier around them is only partially true. Her research focuses on the informal, private, personal, formal and institutional spaces in which Gypsies live their everyday lives, and which can affect their identity and advocacy skills. The acceptance of identity by the majority has proved to be unsuccessful, according to the study, and in the majority of cases has resulted in a negative identity image. According to the researcher, the integration and modernisation strategies developed by the Gypsies still do not help them maintain their identity. However, I do not fully agree with Bindorffer's statement, as the results of my empirical research refute it in many cases. In the case of Generation Y and Z Gypsy girls, it can be observed that contemporary, new elements of identification, less stigmatized dimensions of ethnic identity, which are part of their self-identity, have come to the fore; they can be understood as a kind of integration-modernization strategies aimed at preserving their ethnic identity.

As I mentioned earlier, ethnic identity is in a constant state of flux, which is most likely to occur when an individual's social relations and life are transformed, requiring him or her to acquire new patterns of adaptation and reassess his or her own ethnic identity and the meaning of the dimensions that define it. Patterns that worked in previous generations are no longer always applicable to Generations Y and Z, and so dimensions that were previously less prominent are being excluded, reassessed, changed or even re-emerging. As a consequence, the structure of ethnic identity is also changing.

In the emerging new social context, Generation Y and Generation Z Gypsy girls need to reconstruct their identity. This rational choice is a sign of integration. In their case, mixing with the majority society, which often calls into question some elements of ethnic identity, does not clearly imply an identity crisis or loss of identity. They can distinguish the elements and spaces of ethnic and national identities, and can operate side by side or simultaneously, but with different intensities. The change in intensity in their case depends not only on the situation but also on the identity dimension itself. Thus Bell's (1975) definition of dual identity – the activation of the right identity in the right situation at the right time – is not the same for grandchildren as it is for the second generation. In their case, it is rather a question of a reconstructed identity (Bindorffer, 2001),

of a revival or reinterpretation of old identity elements or of the addition of new ones. However, it is important to note that integration is not quick and easy for Generation Y and Z. Even if they consciously try to change their symbols and identity elements expressing their ethnic identity to elements less burdened by prejudices (e.g. highlighting and emphasising religious elements), without the acceptance of the majority society, a change and an effort to achieve it will not be initiated in these two Roma generations; integration cannot be achieved unless they work together.

Several national and international studies on Roma (Rézműves, 1992; Szuhay, 1999; Fraser, 2002; Tesfay, 2006) touch upon the role of religion in Roma integration. These have observed that Roma adopt the religiosity of their environment, often out of interest, but often do not identify with its intrinsic content. However, these studies are not representative, but mainly qualitative, based on observations. They do, however, describe that Gypsies who show some religious affiliation are more likely to have higher levels of education, but are also more integrated along other indicators – material, employment, place of residence, etc. In 2012, this finding led researchers Gellért Gyetvai and Zoltán Rajki to investigate the integration effect of the strength of religious affiliation. They came to similar conclusions as many other researchers. Religious attachment and community membership generate higher educational attainment, remove individuals from their traditional socialisation environment – often at a very young age – and replaces it with a new socialisation environment with different components.

One of the hypotheses of Fraser's (2002) research on religious Gypsy culture is that the majority of Roma adopt the religion of their environment, but may not necessarily assimilate its inner content. However, moving forward in his research, he found that in France, Spain, England and Eastern Europe, a progressively divergent trend emerged from 1950 onwards. Qualitative research carried out in different countries showed that Roma communities were not only assimilating the religion itself but also internalising its content and changing their integration strategies in light of this.

Rostás-Farkas and Karsai (1992) and Stewart (1994) describe in their study that the majority of the Roma are Catholic. They find that there are many similarities between Catholic cultural customs, iconic imagery and cultural traits specific to the Gypsy community. However, more and more Roma are also present in non-historical churches. Tesfay (2006) investigated Roma identity in Adventist Roma communities in Madrid, and Blasco (2008) in Pentecostal Roma communities in Madrid. In their research, they looked at how religion transforms community relations. Their results show that some cultural elements are invalidated by religion, while others are strengthened. Lőrinczi (2013) and Fosztó (2007) also studied the Adventist Roma community, investigating how much Adventist acceptance of faith and doctrine is a conscious part of Roma integration, how it affects their Roma identity and how it reshapes verbal and non-verbal elements. The majority of the research presented above concludes that integration through religion often occurs at the expense of the defining features of ethnic identity.

Religion as an identity strategy is very important for members of Generation Y and Z – precisely because the church helps to strengthen ethnic identity through the Christian Roma College Network. This dimension has been strengthened, however, because in many cases the customs

and norms, values, and folk costumes, which were so far characteristic of the minority culture, and which determined all aspects of their lives, have been completely transformed and given new meanings. In everyday life, these cultural elements cannot always be seen on the surface, and are therefore expressed in the festive and religious dimension, and are permanent, unchanging elements which in many cases even modernisation and globalisation have not been able to eradicate. Religion plays a key role in the construction of identity.

"When it is a holiday, we put on our traditional clothes and go to church. We stand next to Mama and sing at mass."

"Of course, we often just sing in Gypsy. Of course, I understand what I'm singing."

All of the municipalities included in the research have some kind of church denomination, which provides a level of connection for young people – alongside Roma vocational colleges – where they can live out their ethnic identity. In the interviews, when asked what they think and say about themselves as Roma, most of them identified themselves with their denomination:

"Well, I'm a Greek-Catholic Oláh Gypsy girl."

"Of course... Catholic... Catholic Gypsy."

Members of both generations believe that religion is a way of expressing their belonging to the group and, through it, they can more easily engage in fellowship with members of older generations. They also want to show their loyalty to the group by regularly – and sometimes actively – attending services.

According to Huntington (1999), religion provides a sense of direction in people's lives, a framework of identity and an opportunity to express a sense of identity. The religious dimension in the case of the Generation Y and Generation Z Gypsy girls studied is a stage in which other elements representing ethnic identity, such as language and dress, can also be expressed. Thanks to the religious denominations and religiosity in the settlements, they are able to integrate not only into their own communities but also through them into other Gypsy groups and the Catholic faith community in the country. For example, they regularly go on pilgrimages to Máriapócs, where many Roma young people are present, but they also attend many Catholic celebrations outside their local community.

"It's good that we have these occasions because at least then we can meet other Gypsies. But I've never seen so many Gypsies in one place on such a big holiday."

Masses in the Gypsy language fuse ethnic and religious identities. It is often through the practice of their faith that they are able to live out their ethnicity, or those dimensions of identity that they

no longer dare to assume in a pure and open way. They are also emotionally attached to religion. Respect for and celebration of various religious manifestations (e.g. the Máriapócs Gypsy Feast, the Feast of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross, funerals, weddings, holding Virgin Mary and other saints in high regard, religious symbols, spiritual occasions in vocational colleges) played an important role in the lives of Generations Y and Z. Religiousness acquires ethnocultural significance not in itself, but through liturgies and customs (Ladancsik, 2020). Although prayers are in Hungarian at home and in church, there are functional reasons for this. Because they speak Hungarian better, they can express themselves better. However, this has no impact on their emotional attachment to the Catholic religion and the extent to which it defines their ethnic identity.

"We used to pray in Hungarian with my mother at home. I can express myself better that way, and I understand it better that way. But when we're in church, the service is in Gypsy, and of course, I understand everything, but when I pray, it's better if I say it in Hungarian. That doesn't mean that it's not beautiful, in fact, it's much more beautiful when we sing these beautiful Catholic hymns in Gypsy. I'm so proud to be a Gypsy then! Yes, there's so much you can say in Gypsy... Even if you can't, you know, use it in other places, you don't want to – let's be honest... But here, in the church, it's beautiful... or it is for me, I like it here..."

"We go to Pócs every year. You can't imagine how good it is... Well, you've never seen so many Gypsies in one place, that's for sure... (laughs out loud) It's also good, you know, because, without these religious occasions, I might not meet other religious Gypsies, or Gypsies from outside the village by default. Because there weren't many Gypsies at the university now, and I didn't go anywhere else. And here we meet and worship the Lord together. It's good when you see that other people believe as strongly as you do... I think the Catholic religion is the closest to us. At least if I speak for myself, and I do speak for myself... It's not as easy as being a Reformed or something... The churches are beautifully decorated, gilded and coloured... And for me it was a given: parents and grandparents always came here. There are other places in the settlement, and many Gypsies go there now, mainly because of the music, because there is more freedom, more instruments, you can play the songs in a more Gypsy way, and so I think they feel closer to the religion, or I don't know, so it's easier to live their Gypsy heritage through music, they are like that..."

"Music is indeed closer to the Gypsies, but I think everything else, the paintings, the pictures, the symbols on the wall, the statue of Virgin Mary at home, or the tapestry of Jesus at Mama's, that's closer to the Gypsies... to me..."

The religious events and symbols of the Catholic Church (e.g. pictures, incense, saints, colourful wall paintings) are symbolic elements that Generation Y and Z members can reconcile with the cultural components of their Gypsy identity. Religion therefore greatly helps this generation to develop a stable Gypsy identity. The majority of young people belonging to this ethnic community attend church, not only the larger church occasions. Feasts, joint church

events, and Christian Roma Colleges play a key role in maintaining ethnic identity and acceptance of their own ethnic community.

University, work and peer groups can integrate these generations into the majority society, but religion makes them part not only of this but also of their own ethnic community. Religion thus plays a strategic survival role in preserving ethnic identity.

Summary

The research aimed to investigate the strength and significance of the religious dimension in the lives of Generation Y and Z Gypsy girls in a narrow, specific context. Furthermore, I wanted to see to what extent the living of ethnic identity in a religious dimension can be seen as an integration effort and strategy. However, the findings for the Generation Y and Z Gypsy girls under study are not specific to all Generation Y and Z Gypsy girls, but only to the Christian vocational college students we interviewed. The results suggest that only a well-educated, narrow group that is able to maintain its identity has a chance of integration, while the others are assimilated or discriminated against.

The study showed that Generation Y and Generation Z Gypsy girls show a strong commitment to the religious dimension and are able to live their Gypsy identity along this dimension. This may be because the cultural, religious values and norm systems that are different from the majority society and that are specific to Gypsies are compatible with the elements of ethnic identity that are important to them. In their case, neither modernisation nor globalisation has so far been able to erode this dimension, i.e. there are no signs of full assimilation in these generations. The elements that characterise minority culture are not only alive in the 'festive dimension', but are also expressed in everyday life (Maszlag, 2022).

We have seen that external, structural factors have an impact on the development of the generations' perception of Roma identity. The local community, the majority society, the technological innovations of globalisation and modernisation, civic initiatives, and programmes supporting Roma youth offer new strategies to young generations. The multiplicity of responses has shaken and transformed their social and cultural environment, which had previously seemed stable. New patterns of adaptation need to be learned and applied in today's world.

However, an ethnic group can only survive if it clearly states and represents its own values and identity elements. If they can no longer or dare no longer name their values, if they hesitate to represent identity dimensions for self-identification, or if they can no longer identify them themselves, it is a matter of time before they say goodbye to their ethnic identity and assimilate instead of integrating.

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10

Dóra Menich

Similarities and differences between school bullying and cyberbullying

Introduction

Definitions of school bullying and cyberbullying

Definitions in the literature on school bullying and cyberbullying can be divided into two groups: those that focus specifically on defining bullying online and those that seek to capture the phenomenon of bullying itself. In the former group, the emphasis is on the fact that the harassment is carried out using a technical device (mobile phone, Internet), while in the latter group, the focus is on describing the phenomenon as precisely as possible (repetitive or not, what is the purpose, whether it is committed by an individual or a group, etc.). The lack of a conceptual description of school bullying itself has historical reasons since when research on contemporary bullying was first being carried out, the phenomenon now known as school bullying was only in existence. It will be seen from the definitions presented below that in a few cases, the definition refers to a phenomenon involving students, but in these cases, the emphasis is also on describing bullying.

Generally speaking, all definitions take Dan Olweus, one of the most influential researchers on school bullying, as a starting point. Olweus (1999, p. 717) defines bullying as when *"a student is being bullied or victimised when he or she is exposed, repeatedly and over time, to negative actions on the part of one or more other students"*.

The first group of definitions of harassment includes explanations describing the phenomenon itself. According to these definitions, the main issue is not whether bullying occurs online or offline, but rather what characteristics best capture bullying. (These definitions have typically been used in school bullying research.)

According to Barbara Coloroso, *"bullying is a deliberate, intentional, offensive malicious, rude act aimed at humiliating and hurting the targeted victim"* (Coloroso, 2020, p. 65). In the EU Kids Online 2020 research (Smahel et al., 2020), Kowalski and colleagues (2014) and Olweus define bullying as repeated victimisation, intentional harm and unequal power relations between victim and aggressor. Erika Figula (2004) considers school bullying as a form of aggressive behaviour. In school bullying, one or more peers (or one or more individuals) repeatedly cause or attempt to cause discomfort or intentional harm to a student over a long period of time. According to Mariann Buda, Attila Kőszeghy and Erika Szirmai (2008, p. 374), bullying is defined as "negative activity that is (mostly) directed against a selected person, committed alone or in a group". According to Ken Rigby (2008), it is best to give the most general definition of bullying: bullying is the systematic abuse of power in relationships between people.

The definitions in this group differ in their assessment of whether repetition of the activity is necessary or whether a single act of abusive behaviour can be considered harassment.

The second group includes definitions that define the phenomenon of cyberbullying.

These include definitions by Kids Helpline, KidsHealth, the Blue Line Child Crisis Foundation, Adrienn Ujhelyi, W. J. Smith, Biel Belsey and Mary Aiken. The first three organisations define online bullying as when someone is intentionally hurt or intimidated online or via mobile phones.

According to Adrienn Ujhelyi (2015), cyberbullying is defined as hostile, repetitive and harassing behaviour that occurs through some kind of electronic means. The definitions of cyberbullying by W. J. Smith and Biel Belsey were presented by Dániel Bacsák (2011). According to Smith, cyberbullying is a deliberate, repeated action aimed at hurting an individual or a group using some form of electronic communication, and can be perpetrated by an individual or a group. According to Belsey, harassment takes place via email, mobile phones or websites, with the aim of hurting others. Dr. Mary Aiken (2020) defines cyberbullying (electronic or online harassment) as repeated, critical, hurtful and humiliating comments, often involving a whole group.

An analysis of the definitions of bullying in schools and online shows that they agree that the aim of the activity is to abuse and humiliate the victim and that there is an imbalance of power between victims and bullies. However, there are differences between them in terms of whether they define online bullying explicitly or bullying itself; whether it is a one-off or a repeated activity that can be considered bullying; whether individuals and groups can be both bullies and victims, or whether it is only individuals who are cyberbullied and groups who are victims of hate speech. In the case of cyberbullying definitions, there is a difference in what researchers consider to be the technical means by which bullying is carried out: some researchers consider mobile phones, smartphones or computers, while others consider the internet itself. These differences and unclear issues all point to the need for a single definition that researchers can use for peer bullying, which would facilitate comparability of studies and thus improve understanding of the phenomenon, which would also help to address peer bullying more effectively.

Characteristics of school bullying and cyberbullying

As the definitions have shown, bullying at school and cyberbullying share many similarities. Both types of bullying aim to cause harm or injury; they are typically, but not exclusively, repetitive behaviours; there is an imbalance of power between victim and perpetrator; and the same actors are involved in the bullying in both types of bullying: victims, bullies and bystanders (Fehér, Péter-Szarka, 2011; Domonkos, 2014; Coloroso, 2020).

However, it is important to note that online bullying differs from school bullying in some fundamental characteristics, which in some respects may even make it more harmful (Kurucz, 2012). The first significant difference is anonymity. In the case of school bullying, it is not uncommon for others to know about the bully and the bullying, while in the case of cyberbullying the aggressor has the possibility to remain anonymous (Tatai-Kovács, 2016). This can also be an advantage for bystanders, as they do not have to fear that they will be held accountable for the consequences of the bullying (Bacsák, 2011).

Another important difference is that in the case of online harassment, there can be an almost infinite number of witnesses, as the harassment can spread independently of the harasser, and the victim is victimised multiple times.

There is also a difference in that cyberbullying is very easy to perpetrate but almost impossible to erase. Bullying that is posted online leaves a trace because the internet does not forget (Bacsák, 2011).

Another important difference between school bullying and online bullying is that the latter is not limited by time and space (Kurucz, 2012). Bullying can be committed at any time of the day and from anywhere, whereas in the case of school bullying, it is limited to the time spent at school.

While everyone is exposed to online bullying, in the case of school bullying it is observed that they are typically targeted because of their external characteristics (Tatai-Kovács, 2016).

Looking at bullies, in the case of offline bullying, seeing the victim's reaction will sooner or later make the aggressor feel guilty because he or she realises how his or her behaviour affects the victim, whereas in the case of online bullying, there is no face-to-face situation, so the bully cannot see the effect he or she is having on the victim (Domonkos, 2014).

These two forms of contemporary abuse also differ in type. In the case of bullying in schools, a distinction can be made between physical/verbal/relational and direct/indirect bullying (Buda et al., 2008). Physical/verbal/relational bullying is one of the most commonly used typologies, but not all cases can be clearly classified into these categories. For example, verbal abuse (e.g. name-calling) can also be considered as relational abuse, because it threatens the victim's social relationships and position in the group (Buda et al., 2008). In addition, physical abuse is typically accompanied by verbal abuse. It is important to underline that there is no consensus among experts on whether physical/verbal/relational bullying should be considered as a type or a tool of bullying in schools; for example, while Mariann Buda (2015) classifies it as the former, Coloroso Barabara (2020) classifies it as the latter.

In the other division, direct harassment is direct, overt and openly directed against the victim; it can be physical (pushing, spitting, damaging property), verbal (teasing, threatening) and non-verbal (making faces, showing rude pictures, drawings) (Buda et al., 2008). In contrast, indirect bullying is in most cases relational bullying, in which there is no direct interaction between the bully and the victim (Nagy et al., 2012). This type includes spreading rumours, bullying and sharing malicious images and news on the Internet (Buda et al., 2008). In this sense, it can cover all forms of online bullying.

Several types of cyberbullying can be distinguished. The T.A.B.B.Y. project[1] lists 10 variants, which in practice describe possible forms of online bullying. According to this typology, we can talk about flame war, flaming, harassment, denigration, exclusion, impersonation, outing, trickery, cyberstalking, cyberthreats and sexting.[2]

Barbara Coloroso (2020) categorises types of cyberbullying in two ways: the first includes categories similar to the T.A.B.B.Y. project presented earlier, i.e. forms of bullying, and the second includes surfaces where bullying takes place.

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[1] The T.A.B.B.Y. project's aim is assessing peer online bullying among young people and raising awareness of the phenomenon among parents and teachers. http://tabby-hun.weebly.com/a-tabby-projekt.html (Accessed: 2021. 01. 02.)

[2] http://tabby-hun.weebly.com/mit-jelent-a-cyberbullying.html (Accessed: 2021. 05. 30.)

Coloroso identifies bash boarding, hacking, dissing, flaming, identity theft and rude questioning as types of harassment. The second typology is the platform on which the abuse is committed, distinguishing between harassment via mobile phones, messaging applications, internet games and internet sexual harassment.

The above shows that while there is a consensus among experts on the differences and similarities between bullying in schools and cyberbullying, there are still divergent approaches to the typification of peer bullying, but there is a consensus that online bullying, due to its specificities, should be considered as a separate area.

Participants in school bullying and cyberbullying

As already mentioned in the discussion of the characteristics of contemporary bullying, whether bullying occurs offline or online, the same actors are involved: bullies, victims and bystanders.

Figure 1: Participants in the bullying

Bully	Victim	Bystander
Bully-victim		**Bully's supporters**
Confident bully		**Followers**
Social bully		Passive bullies
Professional bully		Passive supporters
Hyperactive bully		**Victim's protectors**
Suffering bully		Active protector
Group of bullies		Passive protector
Gang of bullies		**Idle bystanders**

Source: *Coloroso, 2014; based on Nagy et al., 2012, own ed.*

Although the literature (Coloroso, 2014) distinguishes the following seven types of bullies in relation to school bullying, I believe that they can also be applied to cyberbullying. The seven categories are the confident bully, the social bully, the professional bully, the hyperactive bully, the suffering bully, the group of bullies and the gang of bullies.

Although several types of harassers can be distinguished, the perpetrators have the same goal: dominance over others, gaining control, and having fun, but also reasons for standing up for friends (Domonkos, 2014). The different types of harassers can lead to a variety of harassment methods, but there are some common characteristics. These include (in addition to those outlined above) a tendency to exploit peers to achieve their goals; committing abuse and harassment when adults are not watching; an inability to assess the short- and long-term consequences of their actions; and a lack of responsibility for their actions (Coloroso, 2014, 2020).

Mariann Buda and colleagues (2008) also distinguish a specific group of harassers, the bully-victims, who are victims in some situations and harassers in other situations. The reason is that they react aggressively to being victimised and try to compensate for their victim role by harassing others.

Victims, like bullies, can be diverse, but what they have in common is that for some reason they have become targets of bullies (Coloroso, 2014). Victims are often thought of as weak, over-sensitive, pathetic, self-doubting people who deserve what happens to them - but anyone can be a victim (Coloroso, 2014). However, some factors increase the chances of victimisation. For example, a person who is "isolated, insecure, with few friends and low self-esteem" and who has poor relationships with peers and classmates (Domonkos, 2014, p. 64). It is also a risk factor if the young person is non-heterosexual or spends more time online, for example on social networking sites (Domonkos, 2014).

Among both offline and online victims of bullying, anxiety, suicidal thoughts and depression are more common (Domonkos, 2014). Victims typically do not report that they are being bullied. This may be due to a sense of shame, fear that the abuse will become more unbearable if they tell because the abuser will retaliate, or a common belief that they cannot be helped (Coloroso, 2014).

The third group includes bystanders, who have recently started to receive more attention in research, as their role and behaviour are key in dealing with bullying, as they are present in the majority of cases and their actions can prevent bullying (Körmendi, Szklenárik, 2014).

Within the group of observers, three broad categories can be distinguished based on their reactions (Nagy et al., 2012). The first type, the supporters of the bullies, can be further divided into three groups: the followers physically support the behaviour of the aggressor, the passive harassers encourage the perpetrator with their comments, while the passive supporters do not participate in the harassment but have a positive attitude towards aggression. The former group is characterised by the fact that they defend the victim, which may lead them to become a victim themselves, while the latter group also reject violence but does not openly support the victim for fear of the abuser. The third type is the bystander.

They are those who are present as bystanders and pretend not to notice what is happening around them. There are two possible reasons for this: one is that they are genuinely indifferent to what is happening, and the other is that they are afraid that they too could become a victim and so they choose to remain silent.

The new approach to the group of observers (Coloroso, 2020) takes a radical view of this group. In this view, bystanders cannot be innocent because if they do not stand up for the victim, they support the abuser, i.e. bystanders are definitely active participants in the abuse and have the duty to stand up for the victim in all circumstances. However, this new approach presupposes that bystanders have the knowledge necessary to effectively deter or prevent harassment, but in my view, these conditions are typically not met. Importantly, however, if we accept this approach, it highlights the shortcomings of prevention and awareness-raising programmes, which, if developed, could help bystanders to become truly active advocates.

Summary

In my study, I compared two types of peer bullying, school bullying and online bullying, in terms of definitions, characteristics and participants, in order to get an idea of the similarities and differences between the two types, which can help to better address and prevent the phenomenon.

In terms of definitions, a consensus has emerged, a common starting point, as Dan Olweus' definition can be found in all definitions of contemporary bullying. However, there are also differences in the descriptions, as researchers who seek to define cyberbullying place great emphasis on the fact that it is carried out through technical means. There is currently no consensus on what constitutes a technical tool, and there is also debate about whether it is necessary to define school bullying and online bullying separately, or whether it is more appropriate to describe bullying itself. An argument in favour of a general definition of bullying could be that both types of peer bullying have the same purpose, so it is not necessary to distinguish whether it occurs offline or online. However, a separate definition of school bullying and online bullying may also have advantages, because although school bullying and cyberbullying are similar in many characteristics and different in others, a single definition allows the differences to be illustrated.

There is also no professional consensus on the typology of contemporary bullying: some researchers classify school bullying as verbal/physical/relational, while others classify it as direct/indirect. In the case of cyberbullying, there is greater agreement on the types: some researchers distinguish ten types, others six, but these categories are largely the same.

There is a shift in thinking about the actors of bullying in the more recent literature, with some authors taking a more radical view of bystanders than before: they are seen as passive bystanders, active bullies or active protectors, depending on whether they stand up for the victims or not. The new approach sees standing up for victims as the group's responsibility.

It is clear that the younger age groups are the most affected by contemporary abuse. The fact that a large part of the lives of this age group is spent on the internet makes it difficult to address the situation. Its daily and varied use, its familiarity, have made online spaces almost a natural part of their lives, and their wariness is therefore likely to be less developed. In recent years, there have been an increasing number of public and civil initiatives to influence this and make people more aware of the dangers, but the role of the family is also crucial. In order to develop more targeted prevention methods and materials, and more effective interventions, it remains important to cover a wider range of these age groups' knowledge, attitudes and involvement as victims and/or perpetrators of possible peer abuse.

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



National Youth Council of Hungary,
Budapest, 2024.

The “Our Unknown Acquaintances: Young People” (“Ismeretlen ismerőseink: a fiatalok”) book series aims to present the situation of the youth and youth workers in Hungary and East-Central Europe to the Hungarian and European public. The National Youth Council’s book series was launched in 2022, in the European Year of Youth, and we plan to contribute 1-2 publications per year to the academic discourse on young people.

The National Youth Council (NYC) is Hungary’s only umbrella organization, which embraces all Hungarian youth and maintains active contact with young people and decision-makers. Since 2012, the mission of our organization has been to represent young people and youth NGOs, to advance youth policy and youth work, to raise young people’s awareness of public issues, and to promote youth dialogue.

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